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2.

Abstract
The spread of misinformation and disinformation is regarded as one of the most salient

challenges for communication professionals around the world. Now, a new technology called
"DeepFakes" or “Synthetic Media” has the potential to further uproot the infosphere. Artificial
Intelligence (AI) will enable the mass creation of synthetic audio-visual content that resembles
real videos, in which people will appear to say or do things they never actually said or did.
The existing literature predominantly focuses on three aspects of DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media: the technical background, coverage of preexisting DeepFakes and possible solutions to
combat the malicious use of the technology. This research study specifically explored whether
communication professionals are adequately prepared for this new phenomenon, as it is likely
to increase uncertainty, erode public trust and create a myriad of liabilities, in terms of crisis
and reputation management. Data was gathered through a survey and interviews with
communication professionals, as well as interviews with technology and policy experts. The
analysis of the data confirmed my hypotheses that communication professionals are not
adequately prepared for the challenge of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, both in terms of
digital literacy and communication strategy. The study further highlighted an alignment gap
between communication professionals and experts, as it pertains to combating the malicious
use of the technology, as well as embracing potentially positive applications. The study
recommends integrating information on DeepFakes and Synthetic Media into education
curricula for communicators. Expert data suggested that the challenge of the new technology is
too complex to be handled by communication and information technology (IT) departments of
individual companies. It is, therefore, important for companies to connect with specialists and
6

consultants that can tie into large-scale efforts by governments, university researchers and
large tech platforms to combat the spread and malicious use of DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media.
By taking steps to alleviate insecurity and fear around the issue, communication
departments could feel more empowered to embrace positive applications of DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media, while, at the same time, having tools and strategies at their disposal to
combat their malicious use.
3.

Introduction
“Seeing is Believing”; this proverb embodies our shared perception of moving images as

prima facie evidence of an event. Audio-visual content has the power to evoke collective
visceral reactions, such as after the killing of George Floyd by a police officer in 2020. However,
our basic expectation that video content depicts reality may not hold true for much longer.
New video manipulation techniques called DeepFakes and Synthetic Media use Artificial
Intelligence (AI) algorithms to create realistic forgeries of people appearing to say or do things
that never actually happened. This kind of image manipulation and face-swapping, replacing
the face of one person with the face of another person, was initially reserved to big budget
Hollywood productions that spent millions of dollars and employed an army of specialists.
However, with new advances in technology, the threshold has been significantly lowered. With
some trial and error, realistic-looking DeepFakes can now be produced by tech-savvy amateurs
on a laptop, within a matter of days, if not hours. It is entirely possible, within the next few
years, that a cellphone with an off-the-shelf app will be sufficient to achieve the same result.
While DeepFakes are still often visually flawed and mostly used for entertainment purposes,
7

such as making the North Korean Dictator Kim Jong-Un sing “I will survive”i or showing
President Obama badmouthing President Trumpii, it is expected that advances in technology
will soon make DeepFakes widespread and indistinguishable from real content. This may lead
to a post-truth environmentiii or Infocalypseiv, a state in which falsehoods can no longer be
distinguished from the truth. This study will investigate the implications for communication
professionals, as this new phenomenon is likely to increase uncertainty, erode public trust and
create a myriad of liabilities, in terms of brand image as well as reputation and crisis
management.

4.

Literature Review

4.1.

The History of Image Manipulation
Image manipulation is almost as old as photography itself. With the invention of

daguerreotypesv in 1839, early photographers quickly discovered that it was impossible for
subjects to keep their eyes open throughout the required exposure time of 3-15 minutes, which
rendered images with blurry pupils. Subsequently, photographers resorted to scratching the
pupils directly into the emulsion of the photographic plates (Brugioni, 1999 p.25)vi.
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Ca. 1864 daguerreotype of Abraham Lincolnvii. Note the clearly defined pupils and the white highlights painted onto
the pupils on the upper right-hand edge. These highlights are commonly used to make the eyes of a subject look
“more alive”. Right image zoomed in and cropped for magnification.

Customers, at the time, were used to being depicted in paintings, which usually
portrayed them in a flattering light. To compete with painters, photographers quickly started
retouching their subjects by directly painting onto the photographic plates to smoothen out
wrinkles and remove other imperfections.
When, the author, Charles Dickens wanted to advertise his United States (U.S.) speaking
tour in 1867, the promoters had an 1861 picture manually retouched to make Dickens appear
younger and conceal his failing health (Bannatyne et al., 2019)viii.
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Original picture, 1861

Retouched picture, 1867. Note the younger
appearance and altered wardrobe

With the wider use of commercial photography in the mid 19th century, image
manipulation became more common and ranged from removing or inserting details, to
combining multiple images through photomontage. The motivation behind the alterations were
manifold and included artistry, humor and, in the case of newspapers, sensationalism to
increase sales (Brugioni, 1999 p.14)vi. Political operatives also quickly discovered the impact of
manipulated images for propaganda purposes. In this example, three 19th century pictures were
combined to create a heroic-looking compound picture of General Grant that distorts historical
facts (Murali et al., 2012)ix.
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Compound Picture of General Grant at City Point (L.C. Handy, ca. 1902)x

The head: General Grant’s head (Fowx, Egbert Guy, June 1864)xi
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The horse: taken from Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook on horseback
(Unidentified photographer, July 1864)xii

The background: confederate prisoners captured in the Battle of Front Royal being guarded in a Union
camp in the Shenandoah Valle (Unidentified Photographer, May 1862)xiii
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The Russian dictator, Joseph Stalin, became quite prolific in removing former allies from
official pictures once they had fallen out of favor.

Nikolai Yezhov, pictured right of Stalin, was later removed from this photograph at the
Moscow Canal (Carvalho et al., 2015) xiv.

Historically, forged images were not only used to rewrite history but also to create
misinformation to slander political opponents. In 1950, at the height of the Red Scare during
the Cold War, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas and Richard Nixon were running against
each other for a seat in the U.S. Senate. Just one week before the election, the front pages of
several California newspapers showed a fake picture of Douglas embracing a well-known
communist activist. Douglas was caught off guard and, with too little time to mount an effective
counterattack, lost the election (Brugioni, 1999 p.129)vi.
In 1988, Adobe released the first version of their Photoshop software. Suddenly,
sophisticated image manipulation was at the fingertips of anybody with a personal computer.
“Photoshopping” became a generic term for digitally altering photographic still images. With
the advance of digital photography, image manipulations became ubiquitous and so seamless
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that they were often no longer detectable as forgeries. Sheila Reaves (1987) explored the
future effect on truth-finding by positing that “the future preponderance of digital photo
editing could make readers cynical of photographic images - regardless of the publication”
(p.48)xv. Now, only roughly 30 years later, every smartphone user has access to a high-quality
camera and a variety of sophisticated tools, such as Instagram filters, to alter still images.

4.2.

The Evolution of Moving Image Manipulation
Just as with still images, the manipulation of moving images started shortly after the

invention of the medium by the Lumiere brothers in 1895. Before the advance of color film
stock, frames were painstakingly hand-colored and photochemical special effects, such as
photo montage and matte painting, were used to create Georges Méliès’ fantastical A Trip to
the Moon (La Voyage dans la Lune) in 1902 (Gaudreault, 2007)xvi.

Scenes from La Voyage Dans La Lune. Note the painted background mattes.
(Star Film Company, 1902)
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Compared to still images, altering moving images proved to be much more complex, as
the retouchers did not only have to change one single image but 18-24 images per second.
Photorealistic alterations of moving images did not become widespread until the advance of
digital intermediates and computer-generated special effects. The new digital technology
allowed Hollywood filmmakers to: insert, the actor, Tom Hanks into historical stock footage,
seemingly shaking the hand of President John F. Kennedy; create a world of dinosaurs,
interacting with humans in Jurassic Park; and bring the doomed cruise ship Titanic back to life,
just to digitally sink it again after hitting a virtual iceberg (Pierson, 2012)xvii.

Actor, Tom Hanks, shaking President Kennedy’s hand in Forrest Gump (Paramount Pictures,
1994)
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Fighting dinosaurs in Jurassic Park (Universal Pictures, 1993)

The sinking Titanic (Paramount Pictures, 1997)
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Faces of actors proved to be notoriously difficult to manipulate. It required a small army
of Hollywood VFX artists and millions of dollars to replace Natalie Portman’s face in Black Swan
(2010) and digitally age Robert DeNiro in The Irishman (2019).

Actor, Robert DeNiro digitally aged in The Irishman (Netflix, 2019)
4.3.

The Technology Behind DeepFakes
According to Moore’s Law, the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit

doubles roughly every two years (Schaller, 1997)xviii. This has led to an enormous growth in
computing power over the last 50 years. Modern smartphones provide several million times the
speed of NASA’s Apollo 11 moon mission guidance computers in 1969 (Puiu, 2021)xix. Computer
software development has also progressed at breakneck speed. The latest quantum leap is the
development of AI algorithms, which are specifically designed to mimic human intelligence. This
new technology enables computers to imitate human behaviors, such as “learning” and
“problem solving” (Flasiski, 2018)xx.
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AI has fueled the development of a new phenomenon called “Synthetic Media”: the
artificial creation or modification of media by computer algorithms. This can range from
generating text, images and videos to voice synthesis and more (Digital Humans, 2021)xxi.
A good example is the image generator at https://thispersondoesnotexist.com (Karras et al.,
2020). With every refreshing of the browser, the underlying algorithm will create a new, unique
photo-realistic image of a person that does not exist.

There are also synthetic media generators for cats: https://thiscatdoesnotexist.com
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And a generator to digitally created synthetic artwork: https://thisartworkdoesnotexist.com.

There are algorithms for synthetic music composition (Gioti, 2021)xxii and AI-powered
Natural Language Generation Algorithms (NLG) that can create synthetic poems that are
indistinguishable from poetry written by humans (Köbis & Mossink, 2021)xxiii.
“DeepFakes”, a subcategory of Synthetic Media, consist of forged videos that are
undetectable, even by experts (Farid, n.d.)xxiv. The most common use of DeepFakes is to overlay
the face of one person, often a celebrity, onto the face of another person in real-time, which, in
the most basic sense, enables the creation of realistic-looking videos of people saying and doing
things they did not actually say or do. The term “DeepFake” is a combination of “Deep
Learning”, which is a class of AI machine learning algorithms, and “Fake”. This technology was
largely confined to the labs of computer scientists until 2017, when a user called “Deepfake”
started posting pornographic videos on the internet forum Reddit that overlayed faces of
celebrities onto existing pornographic footage. Before “Deepfake” was banned from Reddit, he
posted a software called “FakeApp” that enabled amateurs to create their own forged videos.
(Baek, 2020)xxv.
In 2018, BuzzFeed News published a DeepFake video created with FakeApp, in which
former President Barack Obama seemingly announced that “President Trump is a total and
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complete dipshit” (Mack, 2018)xxvi. The video soon revealed, the filmmaker, Jordan Peele
voicing President Obama’s lines, with a warning to the audience that they should no longer
trust any video and that “how we move forward in the age of information is going be the
difference between whether we survive or whether we become some kind of fucked-up
dystopia” (Mack, 2018).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ54GDm1eL0 (Buzzfeed, 2018)

According to Deeptrace, an AI security firm, there were 7,964 DeepFake videos online at
the beginning of 2019. By the end of the year, that figure had increased to 14,678 (Baek, 2020).
DeepFakes are created with a machine learning technique called “generative adversarial
networks” or GANs. The computer scientist Ian Goddfellow invented GAN networks in 2014 to
create new, synthetic data out of existing data sets. For example, an algorithm could look at
thousands of images of a person and then create an entirely new picture of that person that
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never existed in the real world (Schwartz, 2018)xxvii. GANs can also be trained to replicate facial
movement and speech to create forged videos.
GANs usually consist of two AI neural networks that are competing against each other
(hence, “adversarial” networks). One network, the generator, is given an existing data set, for
example images of a person, and then creates an entirely new, synthetic image of that person.
The second network, the discriminator, is tasked with identifying flaws in the new synthetic
image. The two networks go through thousands or millions of cycles until a new synthetic
image is indistinguishable from a real image (Engler, 2020)xxviii. GANs can be setup to work with
a multitude of data sets and can subsequently generate a wide variety of media, such as
images, audio, human speech or video (Garret et al., 2020)xxix.

Symantec, 2018xxx
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According to Farid et al. (2019)xxxi, Deepfakes fall into four different categories:
1) Face replacement and face swapping, in which the face of a source person replaces the face
of a target person (see Obama/Peele video).
2) Face re-enactment, in which portions of a person’s face, such as the mouth or the eyes, are
manipulated.

For reference video see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohmajJTcpNk (Thies et al.,
2019)xxxii
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3) Face generation, in which a completely new face is generated by a GAN network (see
www.thispersondoesnoexist.com).
4) Speech Synthesis, in which somebody’s speech is either altered or a completely new voice
and discourse is created.
While the first DeepFake videos had visible inconsistencies, there is rapid progress being
made to improve the methods and quality, which makes the latest generation of DeepFakes
much harder to detect.
Fried et al. showcased a novel method to edit and change talking-heads speech content using
an AI-powered “text-to-video application” that allows the user to transpose typed words onto
the video of a person speaking that text (2019)xxxiii. In 2018, researchers affiliated with the Max
Planck Institute showcased a new technology called “Deep Video Portraits”, in which a person
can direct the face and speech of a source person in real time (Kim et al., 2018)xxxiv.

Also see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ybLCfVeFL4&t=176s (Jin et al., 2017).
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Only a few years ago, realistic-looking DeepFakes were the sole domain of cutting-edge
Hollywood special effects teams and computer scientists. However, this is changing rapidly.
There is a myriad of shared DeepFake algorithms on code exchange platforms, such as Github.
Users on, the internet forum, Reddit offer high-quality DeepFake creation as a paid service. The
only constraint to a creators’ ability to produce DeepFake videos is access to training data
sets—usually audio and video material used by the GANs. However, in the case of celebrities
and politicians, this kind of material is widely available on the Internet. Furthermore, Zoom
recordings during the Covid-19 pandemic created a treasure trove of image training data. Due
to the progress in AI algorithms, the data set size required to produce high-quality DeepFakes
has significantly decreased, to the point where realistic-looking forged videos can be created
out of as little as 32 images (Zakharov et al., 2019)xxxv. As new depth sensors in modern smart
phones are able to map users’ faces in 3D, an increasing number of amateurs have DeepFakemaking tools at their fingertips.
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The researcher’s face is 3D-mapped and overlayed with a wire mesh mask via the Live Link Face
App on an iPhone 12.
While, historically, GANs required large data sets, apps like Zao, AI Face Swap or Reface
enable users to insert their own faces into movies and TV clips, using only a single image taken
on their smart phone as a data source (O’Donnell, 2021)xxxvi.
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Face swap of actor Tom Hanks in the movie Forrest Gump via Reface App (screenshot).
Replacement face by the author. Only a single image of the researcher taken on an iPhone 10
was used as a reference for the software.
For the complete video clip see: http://www.axelebermann.com/videos/deepfake.mp4
4.4.

Deepfakes and Misinformation
Misinformation is defined as the “sharing of false or misleading information”, while

disinformation is defined as “the creation and sharing of false or misleading information with
the intent of engaging in deception” (Mills & Robson 2019)xxxvii. In the public sphere, both terms
are often only referred to as “misinformation”. DeepFakes and Synthetic Media have the
potential to supercharge the existing challenge of online misinformation and disinformation to
a point that Nina Schick describes as “Infocalypse”: a point at which ubiquitous noise makes it
no longer possible to distinguish between true and false information (2021)xxxviii.
Misinformation and disinformation are not new phenomena and have been used for
political and propaganda purposes for centuries. When the canon boat USS Maine exploded in
the Havana Harbor in 1898, American newspapers misrepresented the incident to incite the
public and sway public opinion towards war with Spain (Chesney & Citron, 2019)xxxix. Hitler
fabricated news of a Polish attack on Germany to legitimize the invasion of Poland in 1939
(Kedar, 2020)xl. In turn, in 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt claimed to be in
possession of a German document that pledged to eliminate the world’s religions. While his
statement contributed to the U.S. joining the fight against Germany in World War II, the
document in question never existed (Hemming, 2019)xli.
There are three factors that make DeepFakes and Synthetic Media more dangerous than
any previous instance of misinformation: (1) the ease with which the new technology enables
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the creation and manipulation of videos, (2) the way in which human beings subconsciously
process imagery and (3) the speed and scope with which misinformation can be spread online,
particularly on social media.
Several behavioral science studies suggest that people are more likely to believe
information that is easy to process. In an environment that relies on the rapid processing of
information, such as the Internet, added imagery influences people’s assessment of the truth
more than just textual information, even if they are unsure about the accuracy of the
information or when they know that the information is inaccurate. A study that stated, “a
woodpecker flies backwards” managed to influence a higher number of individuals in a test
group to rate the statement as “true”, while simultaneously showing a picture of a woodpecker
sitting on a tree. Even though the woodpecker sitting on the tree had nothing to do with the
false assertion of the bird flying backwards, the sheer presence of the image of a woodpecker
swayed the participants to believe the statement (Greifeneder et al, 2021)xlii. The effect of
nudging people toward believing a claim using loosely related photos is called “truthiness”
(Newman et al., 2020)xliii. DeepFakes have the potential to supercharge the phenomenon of
truthiness, as now imagery can be easily manufactured to accurately depict false information,
instead of just reinforcing it through association.

4.5.

The Role of Social Media in the Spread of Misinformation
The third factor contributing to the danger of Deepfakes and Synthetic Media are the

Internet and social media, which have enabled the distribution of information and
disinformation at an unprecedented scale and speed. DeepFakes and Synthetic Media would
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not pose such a significant threat if it wasn’t for social media, which has played a tremendous
role in increasing the amount and reach of false information. Never in the history of humankind
has there been an equally powerful and effective mechanism to share and distribute
information, true or false. Unlike previous mass media systems, such as radio and television,
this distribution mechanism is not limited to professional players. Anybody with a computer or
a smart phone can reach a worldwide audience of several billion viewers via a Tweet or a
Facebook post at zero cost, within a fraction of a second. In 2021, close to four billion people in
the world used social media—that represents over half the total world population of 7.7 billion
(Dean, 2021)xliv. According to Pew research studies, 72% of U.S. adults are engaged on social
media (Pew Research Center, 2021)xlv and, even more importantly, 52% of Americans get their
information from social media instead of traditional news sources, such as newspapers, radio,
or TV (Shearer, 2020)xlvi. Social media has been transformed from a social networking tool into a
primary source of news for users, especially in highly connected Western democracies (Ahmed,
2021)xlvii.
During the 2016 presidential election, a fake Twitter post, claiming that Pope Francis
had endorsed Donald Trump for the Presidency of the U.S., was shared nearly a million times
(Iosifidis, P., & Nicoli, 2019)xlviii. In their research, Fazio et al. describe a phenomenon called the
“Illusory Truth Effect”xlix (2015), which shows that people's belief in false information increases
the more often they are exposed to it. One study found that college students fell for the illusory
truth effect, even when they knew the information to be false, a phenomenon known as
“knowledge neglect” (Fazio et al., 2015)xlix. Donald Trump, a master practitioner of the illusory
truth effect, used the phenomenon, to great effect, leading up to the 2016 presidential election
28

when he claimed that Mexico would pay for a U.S. border wall. Despite the bizarreness of the
claim and Mexico’s repeated insistence that they would not pay for a U.S. border wall, the
statement, through constant repetition, was widely believed by a significant swathe of the
electorate. Allcott and Gentzkow found that pro-Trump fake news was shared over 30 million
times online leading up to the 2016 election (2017)l.
Misinformation is not only capable of influencing our present and future reality but also
our recollection of the past, by seeding false memories. In a 2017 study, participants that had
previously been exposed to a false news headline were more likely to recollect it as truth later,
even when the fake news had explicitly been labeled as “Disputed by 3rd Party Fact-Checkers”
(Resnick, 2017)li.
This phenomenon is known as the “Mandela Effect”, which was named after the South
African leader who was falsely pronounced dead in the 1980s, while imprisoned for his political
activism. Although Mandela had not died in prison and, in fact, became the president of South
Africa after his release, many people remembered the false headlines and thought that
Mandela had died in the 1980s (Emery, 2016)lii. A more contemporary illustration of an effort to
rewrite history by implanting false memories is the recent effort made by Republican Members
of Congress to change the narrative concerning the violence of the January 6th insurrection at
the U.S. Capitol, to the point where Georgia Rep. Andrew Clyde (R) described it as a “normal
tourist visit” (Shamas, 2021)liii, despite ample evidence to the contrary. It is very plausible that
hyper-realistic DeepFakes could be used to distort or completely re-write historic events.
The way in which misinformation spreads online has a significant impact on truthfinding, as research has shown that false information spreads faster online than the truth. An
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analysis of the top-performing articles on Facebook in the months leading up to the 2016
elections found that false information outperformed real news articles, in terms of engagement
metrics, such as shares, likes and comments (Silverman et al., 2016)liv. Another study tracked
126,000 Twitter stories by three million users over ten years and concluded that falsehoods
significantly outperformed truth in all metrics, from network penetration to reach and
distribution speed. The researchers found that information that has a novelty factor, elicits a
threat response and arouses strong emotion has the best chance of being widely shared on
social media (Vosoughi, 2018)lv. Social media users also have the tendency to seek out groups
and content that confirms their views, even to the point of disregarding contradictory
information (Schmidt et al, 2017)lvi. This inductive type of cognitive bias is also known as
“confirmation bias” (Plous, 1993)lvii. Confirmation bias, and the speed at which misinformation
is distributed online, can lead to so called “Information Cascades”: the exponential
dissemination of false news in a very short period of time (Chesney & Citron, 2018)lviii.
The algorithms of social media companies are specifically engineered to micro-target
users with content that has similar messaging and characteristics to maximize their
engagement, which translates into monetization through advertisement revenues. A Buzzfeed
analysis of Facebook pages with political content found that the right-wing Facebook page
“Freedom Daily”, having a 46% false information rate and ranking highest in inaccurate and
misleading information in the U.S., had the highest engagement metrics (Shane, 2017)lix.
These factors have already created a dire situation, as far as the spread of
misinformation and overall truth-finding is concerned, sometimes with significant
consequences. In 2008, a fictitious news story was posted that, Apple founder, Steve Jobs had
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suffered a heart attack. Apple stock subsequently fell by 10%, within only ten minutes.
Misleading tweets from President Donald Trump led to billion-dollar stock losses for Boeing and
Toyota in 2017 (Mills & Robson, 2019)xxxviixxxvii. Disinformation on social media fueled the
genocide against the Rohinga in Myanmar (Davis, 2021)lx.
4.6.

Truth-finding and Post-Truth
The basic principle of truth-finding has always relied on the assumption that truth will

ultimately prevail in the marketplace of ideaslxi. However, a Pew research study found that the
cumulative effect of online misinformation has led to 88% of Americans being confused about
basic facts (Barthel et al, 2020)lxii. At a time when misinformation spreads faster than the truth,
the old paradigm of truth-finding may no longer be valid, leading to what Westerlund describes
as an era of “post-truth” (2019)lxiii, which is defined as "the disappearance of
shared objective standards for truth and the circuitous slippage between facts or alternative
facts, knowledge, opinion, belief, and truth” (Wikimedia, 2021)lxiv.
The historian, Timothy Snyder, wrote after the 2021 storming of the U.S. Capitol
(Snyder, 2021)lxv:

“Post-Truth is pre-fascism... When we give up on truth, we concede power to those with the
wealth and charisma to create spectacle in its place. Without agreement about some basic
facts, citizens cannot form the civil society that would allow them to defend themselves... PostTruth wears away the rule of law and invites a regime of myth.”
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On an even more basic, clinical level the ability to distinguish the real from the unreal is
at the core of how our society defines rationality and sanity (Pennycook et al, 2017)lxvi.
A post-truth environment is marked by truth decay, which is the blurring of facts and
opinion and the disagreement over facts and data interpretation. This results in a lack of trust in
public institutions, which in turns undermines the very foundation of civil society (Kavanagh &
Rich, 2018)lxvii. A Pew Research study found that 68% of participants stated that fake news
undermined Americans' confidence in government institutions (Mitchell, 2020)lxviii . According
to the Edelman Trust Barometer, the erosion of trust has become systemic, with only 15% of
respondents expressing confidence in public institutions (Friedman, 2017)lxix.
4.7.

The Impact of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on the Infospherelxx
The current approaches to countering misinformation, such as labeling posts, have

proven to be largely ineffective (Del Vicario et al, 2016)lxxi. Given the precarious state of the
infosphere, especially online and on social media, DeepFakes and Synthetic Media have the
potential to significantly worsen the existing misinformation crisis.
DeepFakes are particularly suited for the spread of disinformation because social media
users are more likely to trust images and audio over textual information, and DeepFakes are
increasingly indistinguishable from real videos. A research study found that subjects could only
correctly identify DeepFake videos in 50% of all cases, which, statistically, is not better than
random guessing (Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020)lxxii. According to Chesney and Citron, DeepFakes
pose a fundamental danger to society, as they are likely to distort democratic discourse, enable
the manipulation of elections, further erode trust in public institutions, weaken established
news sources and journalism, increase social divisions, undermine public safety and challenge
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the reputations of targeted individuals, with an emphasis on public figures and publicly elected
officials (2018)v. In a study by the Dawes Centre of Future Crime, 31 AI experts from academia,
the private sector, police and government identified DeepFakes as the greatest threat derived
from AI technology (Mark et al., 2020)lxxiii .
DeepFakes will likely be used in a malicious manner by a variety of players, such as
trolls, amateurs, profiteers and criminals, as well as agents of state-organized cyber warfare
(Howard & Bradshaw, 2018)lxxiv. While high-quality Deepfakes are still rare, there have already
been several instances in which the technology was used maliciously. During the 2018 election
in the Netherlands, the Flemish Socialist Party circulated a fake video of, then, U.S. President
Donald Trump encouraging the country to follow the U.S. and withdraw from the Paris climate
accords (Voruit, 2018)lxxv. Towards the end of the video, Donald Trump states “Climate change
is fake, and so is this video”. However, that part was not translated into Dutch. Comments on
social media suggested that many viewers were not aware that the video was fake. Given the
fact that organized social media manipulation campaigns have already been used by political
parties and governments to sway public opinion in 70 countries, it is likely that the use of
DeepFakes in this arena could increase dramatically (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019)lxxiv.
In 2019, an energy company in the United Kingdom was targeted by criminals that used
the synthetically created voice of the company’s CEO to transfer $243,000 from the company’s
German parent company to an account in Mexico (Kietzmann et al., 2020)lxxvi. Open AI, a non profit AI research company, was so worried about the potential for abuse of their AI-powered
speech platform, GPT-3, that they did not release it to the public (Whitaker, 2019)lxxvii.
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In 2019, a DeepFake video showed a man seemingly having gay sex with the Malaysian
economic affairs minister, Azmin Ali, which is illegal in the country. A smear campaign by the
opposition used the fake video to allege that Mr. Ali was not fit for office (Wang et al, 2020)lxxviii.
In 2021, it was reported that hackers had stolen $76.2 million from the Chinese tax
authorities, after creating a biometric, 3D DeepFake model of an employee’s head, using stolen
still images. The model was able to turn its head, blink and open its mouth, which was enough
to override biometric facial recognition security measures (Borak, 2021)lxxix.
A particularly dramatic example for the potential consequences of DeepFake videos
took place in 2018, in Gabon, a country in central Africa. The president, Ali Bongo, was said to
be in ill health and had not been seen in public in months. Rumors circulated that Mr. Bongo
might have died. To discredit the rumors, the administration announced that Mr. Bongo would
give a televised New Year’s address. However, during the event, the president’s speech and
facial expressions seemed strange. Mr. Bongo’s political opponents declared the video to be a
DeepFake and, that as suspected, the president was severely ill or had passed away. As a result,
the political situation in Gabon deteriorated and, within a week, the military launched a coup.
Ultimately, the coup was unsuccessful, and Mr. Bongo returned to power. It was never fully
determined if the video in question had been manipulated or not. But this example highlights
how the sheer existence of DeepFakes can destabilize the infosphere, sometimes resulting in
severe consequences (Toews, 2020)lxxx.
This example describes how DeepFakes can open the doors to a phenomenon called the
“liar’s dividend”, which posits that the presence of synthetic content alone will provide an
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opportunity to raise questions about the veracity of any content or deflect accusations (Engler,
2020)xxviii.
This could also pose significant implications for legal proceedings. Currently, video
footage is considered prima facie evidence. The burden is on the party that questions the
veracity of a video that is presented. However, with the advance of DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media, this paradigm may be turned upside down, meaning that no audio-visual content would
be considered true, unless the authenticity of the content could be verified (Venema et al.,
2020)lxxxi.
The potential, future malicious uses of DeepFakes are manifold and could potentially
include extortion, blackmail, theft, identity theft, exploitation and personal sabotage. What
would have happened if a DeepFake video of a politician would have fanned racial tensions
during the George Floyd protests? What would the consequences be of a manipulated video
showing the Israeli prime minister seemingly desecrating the Koran? How would the U.S.
electorate react to manipulated videos of election officials alleging fraud? How would North
Korean leadership react to a DeepFake of the United States President announcing a nuclear
strike? The consequences would be nothing short of catastrophic (Toews, 2020)lxxxii.
The terrorist group, ISIS, has already proven to be extremely media-savvy in their
recruitment efforts and could distribute fake videos of U.S. troops shooting civilians or
discussing plans to bomb a mosque. As previously outlined, cognitive bias, in an already
mistrusting audience, will make DeepFake videos particularly difficult to dispel (Chesney &
Citron, 2019)xxxix.

35

A 2019 Deepfake report presented to the U.S. Congress stated that deliberately
misleading, synthetic audio-visual content could target politicians and public institutions with
the aim of undermining the democratic process and public trust. The report also highlighted the
possibility of increased incitement, an increased number of public safety crises and increased
violence because of DeepFakes (Senate Report 116-93, 2019)lxxxiii. Chesney and Citron posit that
additional harmful effects on society could include manipulations of elections, enhancement
and exploitation of social divisions and harm to military and intelligence operations, as well as
threats to the economy and damage to international relations (2018)lviii.

4.8

Combatting DeepFakes and Synthetic Media
A wide variety of private and public institutions are researching methods to detect and

combat DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. The director of the Pentagon’s Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center, Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, stated that DeepFakes constitute a national
security threat and emphasized the urgency to invest heavily in technology to counter this
challenge (Strout, 2019)lxxxiv. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
announced a number of programs including Media Forensics (MediFor) and Semantic Forensics
(SemaFor), with the declared goal of leveling “the digital imagery playing field, which currently
favors the manipulator, by developing technologies for the automated assessment of the
integrity of an image or video” (Galston, 2020)lxxxv.
In 2019, Facebook partnered up with six leading academic institutions and other
companies, among them Amazon and Microsoft, to launch the “DeepFake Detection
Challenge”, which is designed to jumpstart innovation in the field of detecting and combatting
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DeepFakes and Synthetic Media (Wubet, 2020)lxxxvi. Google has provided researchers with data
sets of synthetic speech to create technologies that will be able to detect and combat
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media (Hwang, 2020)lxxxvii. The Coalition for Content Provenance and
Authenticity is a new organization, consisting of various stakeholders, such as tech firms
(Adobe, Microsoft, Intel, Twitter, Truepic) and media organizations, such as the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that collectively seek to develop a system that “addresses the
prevalence of misleading information online through the development of technical standards
for certifying the source and history (or provenance) of media content”lxxxviii.
In terms of forensics, there are a variety of approaches available to track inconsistencies
in DeepFake video footage: anomalies in eye blinking patterns (Li et al., 2018)lxxxix, distortion of
facial features, (Li & Liu., 2019)xc contrast inconsistencies across images within a video (Guerra
& Delp, 2018)xci, reflection and detail patterns in teeth and eyes (Matern, Riess, & Stamminger,
2019)xcii and inconsistencies in biometric patterns, such as blood flow in the skin (Shruti et al,
2019)xciii. Borinetti et al. (2020) use Benford’s Law, which describes the distribution of the most
significant digit for the quantized Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficient, to detect
DeepFakes by analyzing the underlying image source code and looking for mathematical
inconsistenciesxciv. Other researchers suggest using a distributed ledger or block chain to
authenticate audio and video content (Chesney & Citron, 2019)xxxix.
Individuals who fear that they may be targeted with DeepFakes can use a practice called
“Life Logging”, which means digitally documenting your life around the clock to be able to
debunk possible DeepFakes (Hwang, 2020)xcv. Truepic is already offering a service to upload
content to their cloud to prove image authenticity (Hasan et al., 2019)xcvi.
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4.9.

Shortfalls of Countermeasures
So far, all efforts to stem the tide of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are falling short.

Hany Farid, a digital-forensics expert at the University of California at Berkeley and a pioneer in
the field of Synthetic Media, posits that there are about 100 times more people working to
develop Synthetic Media than there are those working to detect it (Harwell, 2019)xcvii. From a
technical point of view, the very nature of adversarial networks, such as the GAN networks that
are used to create DeepFakes, means that any countermeasure can be used to train the
algorithms to overcome the detection. According to Wubet, the best performer in the Facebook
"Deepfake Detection Challenge", was only able to achieve a disappointing accuracy rate of 65%
(2020)Ixxv.
For authentication methods, such as block chain or reverse lookup, the technology
would have to be widely implemented across all platforms. There is currently no such
overarching standard or technology, and it is unlikely that this will be available for the
consumer anytime soon (Engler, 2020)xcviii.
Life logging is intrusive and carries a significant risk. The defense department’s research
arm, DARPA, discontinued its 2004 LifeLog project due to public pushback and privacy concerns
(Allen, 2008)xcix.
4.10. Legal Implications of Deepfakes and Synthetic Media
In the U.S., most DeepFakes are covered under the Freedom of Speech provision in the
First Amendment. From a legal standpoint, many states already have statutes that outlaw the
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nonconsensual creation of pornography, which, theoretically, should also apply to Deepfake
pornography. However, case law is limited, or non-existent, thus far (Gerstner, 2020)c.
Social media platforms are largely shielded from the legal consequences, as it pertains to the
content on their platforms, through § 230 of the Communications Decency Act that states “no
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider” (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)
(1998).
Individuals that have become victims of malicious DeepFakes can sue for defamation, libel or
slander in civil court. However, for public figures, who are the most likely targets, the bar for
such lawsuits is high as, “actual malice” would have to be proven in order to prevail in court
(Gerstner, 2020)c . There are several states that have explicitly outlawed political DeepFakes.
However, it is uncertain that these laws would withstand First Amendment challenges in court
(Zumut, 2021)ci. Considering how notoriously difficult it is to identify and prosecute
perpetrators of misinformation, it is to be expected that the same will apply to DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media (Gerstner, 2020)c.

4.11. Consequences for Communication Professionals
Moody’s, the credit rating firm, warned of the potential negative consequences that
DeepFake videos could have on companies’ reputations (Mandavia, 2019)cii. Mills & Robson
outlined the risk of brand damage through disinformation (2019)ciii. Aviv & Bienstock raised the
example of reputation damage, by presenting the example of a DeepFake of a CEO announcing
a large charitable donation. Would it be more prudent for the company to make the donation
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or debunk the fraud and risk reputation damage (2018)civ? Mirchandani proposes another
hypothetical scenario in which a CEO would state his uncertainty about a company’s product in
a DeepFake video (2020)cv. In March 2021, the Cyber Unit of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) issued a Private Industry Notification, warning corporations about the
impending challenge of Synthetic Media:

“Malicious actors almost certainly will leverage synthetic content for cyber and foreign
influence operations in the next 12-18 months. Foreign actors are currently using synthetic
content in their influence campaigns, and the FBI anticipates it will be increasingly used by
foreign and criminal cyber actors for spear phishing and social engineering in an evolution of
cyber operational tradecraft” (FBI Cyber Unit)cvi.

Bracken states that in a world of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, companies will have
to operate from a baseline of “zero trust”, as audio and video information can no longer
automatically be considered authentic (2021)cvii .
4.12. Sources of Criticism
As previously outlined, image manipulation and its use for malicious purposes have
existed since the invention of photography. Every time a new technology or media distribution
vehicle enters the market, the default attitude is to predict a doomsday scenario. Plato warned
society against the devastating consequences, should writing prevail over the spoken word. He
stated that this development had the potential to “destroy human memory, weaken the mind,
and lead to personal and social passivity” (Tadlin-Segal & Oppenheim, 2020)cviii. In the early 20th
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century, critics of the telephone predicted that it would jeopardize privacy and promote
indecency (Fisher & Wright, 2001)cix.
When Photoshop was introduced as an image manipulation tool in 1988, critics
predicted the end of the era of photographic images as prima facie evidence of an event. And,
while some of their prediction has come to pass, the societal outcome for photographic images
is much more moderate and nuanced (Wrestling, 2019)cx.
Propagandists and criminals, who have the means to deploy DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media for malicious purposes, are pragmatists. A “shallow fake” (also called “cheap fake”)
targeting House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, in which her speech was slowed down to suggest she
was inebriated, reached 2.5 million views within 24 hours (Brown, 2020)cxi. As long as this kind
of low-tech disinformation is successful, it is unlikely that purveyors of disinformation will go
through the effort and expense of creating Deepfake videos on a large scale.
Not all uses of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are negative. The soccer star, David
Beckham, appeared in a public service announcement against malaria that used Deepfake
technology to allow him to speak in several languages (Kavanagh & Rich, 2018)lxvii. For
education purposes, Synthetic Media of historical figures could help teachers in the classroom
(Lomas, 2021)cxii. In the fashion retail industry, customers would be able to virtually try on new
clothes, and, in the medical world, Deepfake avatars could enable handicapped people to
communicate (Katarya & Lai, 2020)cxiii.
5.

Project Rationale
Communication professionals have yet to develop effective solutions to combat

misinformation and disinformation, especially on the Internet. The malicious use of DeepFakes
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and Synthetic Media has the potential to further corrupt the information ecosystem, possibly to
the point of an Infocalypse (Schick, 2020)cxiv, a state in which truth and misinformation have
become indistinguishable. This has grave implications for everything from corporate policy and
geopolitics to our individual lives. Usually, the malicious use of a new technology will first
advance relatively unconstrained, before efficient countermeasures can be developed and
deployed. Therefore, communication professionals, already overwhelmed by the current flood
of misinformation, may be pushed to the brink.
Most of the current literature on DeepFakes and Synthetic Media is in the field of
computer science, behavioral science and law. To date there have only been a limited number
of research studies on the effects of DeepFakes on the field of communication studies (Godulla
et al., 2021)cxv. Specifically, there is no research on the preparation level of communication
professionals, as far as dealing with DeepFakes and Synthetic Media is concerned. This paper
aims to fill that gap.
Another aspect which highlights the relevancy of this paper is that AI technology is
evolving so quickly that any research is only able to provide a snapshot of a moment in time. As
far as DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are concerned, a three-year-old research study may
already be considered outdated, which underlines the need for constant research based on
current data.
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6.

Research Questions

R1: To what extent are communication professionals prepared for the increasing spread of
misinformation through DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?
R2: Is there an alignment gap between communication professionals and experts, as far as
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are concerned?

7.

Expected Findings
Overall, I expect that communication professionals are unprepared for the impending

challenge of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. Key decision makers tend to be of an older
generation (Gen-X) that is less likely to organically adapt to the rapid changes in information
technology when compared to their younger peers (Gen-Z and Millennials). This means the
industry is prone to only react to the phenomenon of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media when it
has become a significant problem, instead of proactively working on forward-looking solutions.
From a technological standpoint, I expect there is a significant knowledge and
implementation gap between the experts, and the solutions they are proposing, and
communication professionals, who will either be overwhelmed by the new technology or will
be reluctant to implement it.
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8.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis H1: Communication professionals are unprepared for the advance of DeepFakes
and Synthetic Media, both in terms of digital literacy and communication processes.
Hypothesis H2: There is an alignment gap between communication professionals and tech
experts, as far as general sentiment and approaches to combatting DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media are concerned.

9.

Research Methods
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, when used maliciously, constitute a subcategory of

misinformation and disinformation. In this respect, it is important to study three areas:
1) The current status quo of misinformation and disinformation in the communications
sphere.
2) The current state of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media.
3) The potential future impact of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on communication
professionals.
To facilitate data collection that explores the current status quo but also gives the
participants and researcher the opportunity to study avenues of exploration that look into the
future, I designed a two-tiered, mixed methods approach consisting of a quantitative survey
and qualitative interviews.
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The first part consists of an online survey with professional communicators to establish
a quantifiable baseline of the following three areas:
1) Computer and technology literacy.
2) Perspective on misinformation as a challenge for communicators.
3) Awareness and perspective on DeepFakes and Synthetic Media.
The second, qualitative part consists of two segments. The first segment is a
series of semi-structured interviews with communication professionals, which aims to garner a
more nuanced and expansive insight into the extent to which corporate communicators are
aware of, and prepared for, the challenge of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. This format is
specifically designed to allow for a variety of responses from participants working in different
industries.
The second segment is a series of semi-structured interviews with DeepFake and
Synthetic Media experts. The goal of this setup is to explore and contrast similarities and
differences between the two professions, as far as their sentiment and knowledge of this new
phenomenon are concerned.
Another objective of this design is to expose a possible alignment gap between
communication professionals and best practices and methodologies recommended by experts.
The interview will encourage communication professionals, as well as experts, to explore
strategies to close this gap.
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9.1.

Online Survey of Professional Communicators

The online survey was conducted on the platform Qualtrics. The participants, all fulltime employees (age 18-65) working in the communication field, were asked a total of 35
Likert-Scale and check box questions. They consisted of four demographic questions that
established participants' ages, experiences and industries, followed by a set of 19 questions
about digital literacy and participants' thoughts about misinformation in general and
particularly within their organization. The third part of the survey explored the participants'
literacy, as far as DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are concerned, as well as their opinion on
how this new challenge might affect their organization in the present and the future. Please see
Appendix A for the full list of questions.

9.2.

Survey Sampling

The target sample pool for the survey consisted of a total of 150 organizations: 50 nonprofit, 50 for-profit and 50 political think tanks. The reasoning behind this sample pool was to
represent wide variety of organizations and interests and to contrast approaches and literacy
between the different categories. Potential participants were contacted through their LinkedIn
profiles or by contacting the communication departments of their respective organizations.
Additionally, potential candidates were encouraged to share the survey link via snowball
sampling. The survey was also sent out to Baruch College Alumni, through the Baruch Office of
Graduate Services.
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9.2.1

Sampling: Non-Profit Organizations
Non-profit organizations were chosen from the online publication Top 100 Nonprofit

Organizations (2021 Edition) (2021, May 3)cxvi. From the initial pool of 100 organizations, 50
organizations were picked through random sampling applied via the online tool
www.numbergenerator.orgcxvii. Please see Appendix B for the selection criteria applied by the
webpage publishers, randomization process and companies.

9.2.2

Sampling Limitations: Non-Profit Organizations
There was no control over which individuals from the companies would participate in

the survey. As the Qualtrics survey was distributed via a generic link, vs. a unique, trackable link
for each request, there was no mechanism to prevent participants from filling out multiple
surveys or unrelated parties taking the survey. However, I considered this risk to be negligible.
Furthermore, the introduction of snowball sampling may have resulted in the inclusion of
participants that were not from the 50 non-profit organizations that were randomly chosen.
While the authors of the initial data set listed their criteria for inclusion, I accepted their
criteria for inclusion without validating them. Given that there are around 1.54 million nonprofits registered in the U.S.cxviii , a sample size of 50 is relatively small. Also, several categories,
such as colleges, universities and individual churches, were not included in the initial data set.

9.2.3

Sampling: For-profit Organizations
Fifty for-profit organizations were chosen from the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500),

which is "a free-float weighted measurement stock market index of 500 of the largest
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companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States. It is one of the most commonly
followed equity indices" (Wikipedia)cxix. From the initial pool of 500 organizations, 50
organizations were picked through random sampling applied via the online tool
www.numbergenerator.orgcxx. Please see Appendix B for the initial selection criteria used by
the website publishers, the detailed randomization process, and the list of chosen companies.

9.2.4

Sampling Limitations: For-profit Organizations
There was no control over which individuals from the organizations would participate in

the survey. As the Qualtrics survey was distributed via a generic link, vs. a unique, trackable link
for each request, there was no mechanism to prevent participants from filling out the survey
multiple times or unrelated parties taking the survey. However, I considered this risk to be
negligible. Furthermore, the introduction of snowball sampling may have resulted in the
inclusion of participants that were not from the 50 for-profit organizations that were randomly
chosen. The use of the S&P500 as an initial data set means that the sample pool was limited to
large corporations listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Given that there are approximately 550,000
companies in the U.S.cxxi, the sample size was relatively small.

9.2.5

Sampling: Political Think Tanks
Fifty political think tanks were chosen based on the data set retrieved from The 50 Most

Influential Think Tanks in the United States on TheBestSchools.org (2021, March 31)cxxii . Please
see Appendix B for details on names, inclusion criteria and political orientation of the individual
organizations.
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9.2.6

Sampling Limitations: Political Think Tanks
There was no control over which individuals from the organizations would participate in

the survey. As the Qualtrics survey was distributed via a generic link, vs. unique, trackable links
for each request, there was no mechanism to prevent participants from filling out the survey
multiple times. However, I considered this risk to be negligible.
Furthermore, the introduction of snowball sampling may have resulted in the inclusion of
participants that were not from the 50 political think tanks in the original sample pool.
According to the Harvard Kennedy School, there are currently more than 1984 think
tanks in the UScxxii, which means that a sample size of 50 is relatively small.

9.2.7

Survey Response
The survey was live for the duration of two months, from August 23 until October 23,

2021. A total of 1041 requests were sent out to potential participants: 220 to for-profit
organizations, 192 to non-profits and 193 to political think tanks. 436 requests were sent out to
alumni of Baruch College. Initially 71 participants clicked on the survey link. This is equivalent to
a 6.8% response rate. The response rate of the individual categories (non-profit, for-profit,
political think tank) could not be determined, as I did not have access to the list of alumni
contacted through the Baruch Office of Graduate Services.
One participant decided not to continue the survey after reading the informed consent
information that preceded the survey. Out of the remaining 70 participants, 14 indicated that
they were not full-time communication professionals and were rotated out of the survey.
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From the remaining pool of 56, one participant indicated that he was over the age of 65 and
was rotated out of the survey to comply with IRB requirements that require protection of
potentially vulnerable participants.
In the survey section on DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, seven participants that
answered that they had never heard of the terms were rotated out, as it would be unlikely that
they would be able to contribute meaningful responses to the following, more nuanced
questions on the subject matter.

9.2.8

Semi-structured Interviews with Communication Professionals
Participants were recruited through a voluntary sign-up form at the end of the survey

and through direct outreach via email and LinkedIn. The semi-structured interviews were
conducted remotely via Zoom between August 25 and October 21, 2021. They were
subsequently transcribed via the Zoom live-capturing feature. The transcripts were checked for
accuracy, and if necessary, edited and amended for clarity using the original recording file. A
total of 13 interviews were conducted with participants falling into the following categories:
One political think tank, seven non-profit organizations and five for-profit organizations.
Participants were asked a varying number of questions, from a pool of 18 questions, covering
topics such as misinformation, disinformation, technical literacy and DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media. The questions were structured to begin with an examination of the current status quo
and become more forward-thinking towards the end of the interview. For the full question list,
see Appendix C.
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As there was also an exploratory aspect to the research, I used inductive coding to
develop themes after a preliminary exploration of the data. Of particular interest were
commonalities and differences in the assessments of tech literacy, the state of the information
sphere and the current status of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. Another aspect of the
interviews was to compare the gathered data with data gathered from DeepFake and Synthetic
Media experts, to explore commonalities and differences in terms of approach and outlook.

9.2.9

Semi-structured Interviews with DeepFake and Synthetic Media Experts
The participant pool consisted of tech and policy experts in the areas of DeepFakes and

Synthetic Media. Potential participants were chosen based on publications and scientific
research papers. The source article research was conducted online from July 1 to September
15, 2021, using the search engines Google, Google Scholar and Baruch OneSearch. Keywords
applied were DeepFake, Deep Fake, Synthetic Media, expert, countermeasure, policy,
communication, artificial intelligence, AI, video and risk. From the resulting 173 publications,
109 tech and policy experts were contacted either directly via their published emails or via their
organizations. This yielded 12 responses (11% response rate) resulting in five interviews (4.6%
participation rate). The participants were from the following categories: Two policy experts,
two university researchers and one cyber security professional.
The semi-structured interviews were conducted remotely via Zoom between August 25
and October 21, 2021 and transcribed via the Zoom live-capturing feature. The transcripts were
checked for accuracy, and if necessary, edited for clarity by the researcher using the original
recording file.
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Coding and analysis were conducted using the same method as previously outlined for
the semi-structured interviews with professional communicators.

9.2.10

Ethical Considerations
All research participants were between the ages of 18 and 65, in order to protect

vulnerable populations. Every potential participant was given a notice for informed consent
prior to participating in the research study. The survey was fully anonymous. The recruitment of
interview partners, at the end of the survey, was done via a second, embedded survey, to
separate the survey data from the volunteers' contact information.
The interviews were conducted following the City University of New York (CUNY) Zoom
Security Protocol. The recorded files were transcribed, and the transcriptions were anonymized
to protect the participants. Subsequently, all recordings were permanently deleted. The risk of
a data breach was minimized by containing the data to the researcher's the passwordprotected computer. Please see Appendix D for details of consent forms.
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10. Analysis
This research study was designed using a mixed methods approach that consisted of a
survey with communicators followed by semi-structured interviews with communicators and
experts.
The survey opened with questions on demographics, then explored the current status of
misinformation and ended with more specific questions covering DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media.
10.1

Communication Professionals Survey Analysis

10.1.1

Demographics

10.1.1.1

Question: “What is your age?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Under 18 years old

0.00%

0

2

18-24 years old

5.45%

3

3

25-32 years old

21.82%

12

4

33-45 years-old

29.09%

16

5

46-65 years-old

41.82%

23

6

66 years or older

1.82%

1

7

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

55
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In order to protect vulnerable populations, the participant over 66 years of age was rotated out
of the survey.
10.1.1.2
Question: “How many years of work experience do you have in the
communication field?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

3

9-15 years

24.07%

13

2

4-8 years

16.67%

9

1

1-3 years

14.81%

8

4

more than 15 years

44.44%

24

5

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%
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Analysis:
While all experience ranges are represented, most participants (68.51%) have more than 9
years of experience in the communication field.
10.1.2

Digital Literacy

10.1.2.1

Question: “How would you rate your digital literacy?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Poor

0.00%

0

2

Fair

1.85%

1

3

Good

5.56%

3

4

Very good

42.59%

23

5

Excellent

50.00%

27

6

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%
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#
1

Field Minimum Maximum Mean
How would you rate your
digital literacy?

2.00

5.00

4.41

Std
Variance Count
Deviation
0.68

0.46
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Analysis:
Overall, the participants were relatively confident in their digital literacy. This could either
mean that the participants do have a high level of digital literacy, or, as this is a self-assessment,
it could reflect a certain degree of over-confidence in their digital abilities.
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10.1.2.2

Cross Tabulation: Digital Literacy & Age

What is your age?
Average
Total

Under 18

18-24

25-32

33-45

46-65

0.0%
1.9%
5.6%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

42.6%

0.0%

Excellent
Prefer not to answer

50.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
8.3%
58.3
%
33.3
%
0.0%

0.0%
6.3%
0.0%
25.0
%
68.8
%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
8.7%
43.5
%
47.8
%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Very good

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
66.7
%
33.3
%
0.0%

54.0

0.0

3.0

12.0

16.0

23.0

0.0

No answer

How would you rate your
digital literacy?
Poor
Fair
Good

Total Count (Answering)

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Analysis:
The younger generation did not rate their digital literacy higher than their older peers. While
the data was not conclusive enough to show clear trends, this could suggest that digital literacy
is an acquired skill. Or, as this is a self-assessment open to bias, it could mean that older
generations were overconfident in their digital abilities.
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10.1.2.3

Question: “How would you rate the digital literacy of your
organization’s decision makers?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Poor

1.85%

1

2

Fair

11.11%

6

3

Good

31.48%

17

4

Very good

37.04%

20

5

Excellent

18.52%

10

7

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

54
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#
1

Field Minimum Maximum Mean
How would you rate the digital
literacy of your organization’s
decision makers?

1.00

5.00

Std
Variance Count
Deviation

3.59

0.97

0.95

54

Analysis:
Overall, with a mean score of 3.59 out of 5.0, the participants had a relatively high level of
confidence in the digital literacy of their leadership. However, with an average personal score
of 4.41, they did not regard the digital skills of their leadership as high as their own.
10.1.2.4

Cross Tabulation: Digital Literacy & Industry Category

Total Count

Nature of Organization
Political
Think Tank
Other

Total

For-Profit

Non-Profit

Prefer not to answer

54.0

21.0

22.0

6.0

4.0

1.0

1.9%
11.1%
31.5%
37.0%
18.5%

0.0%
4.8%
38.1%
33.3%
23.8%

4.5%
18.2%
27.3%
45.5%
4.5%

0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
50.0%
33.3%

0.0%
25.0%
25.0%
0.0%
50.0%

0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

3.59

3.76

3.27

4.17

3.75

Digital Literacy
of Decision Makers
Poor
Fair
Good
Very good
Excellent
Prefer not to
answer
Min = 1
Max = 5
Mean

59

Analysis:
Overall, the employees in the political think tank category had the highest confidence in the
digital literacy of their leadership (4.17), followed by for-profit organizations (3.76) and nonprofit organizations (3.27). This is somewhat surprising, as the for-profit organizations, with an
underlying sample pool focused on S&P500 companies, should have significantly more
resources. However, due to the small participant count in the political think tank category, a
few outliers could easily distort the overall picture.
10.1.3

Misinformation and Disinformation

10.1.3.1.

Question: “Does your organization have written guidelines on how to
deal with misinformation?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Yes

26.92%

14

2

No

53.85%

28

3

I don't know

19.23%

10

4

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

52

Analysis:
Despite the widespread problem of misinformation and disinformation, over 50% of all
organizations reported that they did not have written policies. Close to 20% of communicators
didn't know if such a policy existed within their organization. Only a quarter of participants
indicated that their company had written policies in place.
10.1.3.2

Cross Tabulation: Misinformation Guidelines & Industry Category

Total
Written Guidelines on
Dealing with Misinformation
Total Count (Answering)
Yes
No
I don't know
Prefer not to answer

What does best describe the nature of your organization?
ForNonPolitical
No
Profit
Profit
Think Tank
Other
Answer

52.0

21.0

21.0

6.0

3.0

1.0

26.9%
53.8%
19.2%
0.0%

38.1%
57.1%
4.8%
0.0%

23.8%
38.1%
38.1%
0.0%

0.0%
83.3%
16.7%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

61

Analysis:
It is surprising that in the category ‘political think tanks’, a group in which misinformation
represents a significant challenge, not a single participant answered “yes” to this question. One
explanation could be the relatively small sample size. Non-profits also seem shockingly
unprepared with over 75% of participants answering “no” or “I don’t know”. For-profit
organizations fared slightly better, but still well below what would be expected.
10.1.3.3

Questions: “Does misinformation create communication problems for
your organization?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

No problem

5.88%

3

2

Minor Problem

39.22%

20

3

Moderate Problem

33.33%

17

4

Serious Problem

13.73%

7

6

I don't know

7.84%

4

7

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

51

Analysis:
Only 5.88% of respondents indicated that misinformation was “no problem” for their
organization.
10.1.3.4

Question: “How effective is your organization in dealing with
misinformation?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Ineffective

1.92%

1

2

Somewhat ineffective

7.69%

4

3

Neither effective nor ineffective

3.85%

2

4

Somewhat effective

36.54%

19

5

Effective

34.62%

18

6

I don't know

15.38%

8

7

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

52

#
1

Field Minimum Maximum Mean
How effective is your
organization in dealing with
misinformation?

1.00

6.00

4.40

Std
Variance Count
Deviation
1.15

1.32

52

Analysis:
With a mean score of 4.4 out of 5.0, 71.16% of respondents rated their organization as
“somewhat effective” or “effective”.
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10.1.3.5

Question: “Are you concerned that misinformation will become an increased
communication challenge in the future?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Not at all concerned

0.00%

0

4

Slightly concerned

1.92%

1

5

Somewhat concerned

15.38%

8

6

Moderately concerned

40.38%

21

7

Extremely concerned

38.46%

20

8

I don't know

1.92%

1

9

Prefer not to answer

1.92%

1

Total

100%

52
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#

1

Field Minimum Maximum Mean
Are you concerned that
misinformation will become an
increased communication
challenge in the future?

4.00

9.00

Std
Variance Count
Deviation

6.29

0.88

0.78

52

Analysis:
As it pertains to the impact of misinformation in the future, 94.22% of respondents were at
least “somewhat concerned” and 38.46% were “extremely concerned”.

10.1.3.6

Question: Do you agree/disagree with the following statement?
“Misinformation is a substantial challenge to our organization’s
reputation and brand image.”
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#

Answer

%

Count

31

Somewhat disagree

15.38%

8

32

Neither agree nor disagree

13.46%

7

33

Somewhat agree

25.00%

13

34

Agree

26.92%

14

35

I don't know

1.92%

1

36

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

37

Disagree

17.31%

9

Total

100%

52

Analysis:
More than half of the participants (51.92%) "agree" or "somewhat agree" that misinformation
represents a threat to their organization’s reputation and brand image, vs. 32.69% who
"disagree" or "somewhat disagree". As DeepFakes and Synthetic Media represent a
subcategory of misinformation, it is likely that they will also be a problem in the future, when
this technology is more prevalent.
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10.1.3.7

#

Question: Do you agree/disagree with the following statement?
“Misinformation influences the communication strategy of our
organization.”

Answer

%

Count

31

Somewhat disagree

13.73%

7

32

Neither agree nor disagree

7.84%

4

33

Somewhat agree

29.41%

15

34

Agree

23.53%

12

35

I don't know

3.92%

2

36

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

37

Disagree

21.57%

11

68

Total

100%

51

Analysis:
Approximately half of the participants (52.94%) “agree” or “somewhat agree” that
misinformation factors into their organization's reputation strategy, vs. 35.3% that "disagree"
or "somewhat disagree". This is in line with the previous paragraph that explored whether
misinformation was a challenge for their organization.

10.1.3.8

Question: Do you agree/disagree with the following statement:
"My organization is well prepared to deal with misinformation."
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#

Answer

%

Count

31

Somewhat disagree

16.00%

8

32

Neither agree nor disagree

16.00%

8

33

Somewhat agree

34.00%

17

34

Agree

28.00%

14

35

I don't know

2.00%

1

36

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

37

Disagree

4.00%

2

Total

100%

50

Analysis:
More than half of the respondents (62%) “somewhat agree” or “agree” that their organization
was well prepared to deal with misinformation vs. 20% who somewhat disagree or disagree.
Only 4% of respondents "disagree", which reflects that employees have a high level of
confidence in their organization's readiness to deal with misinformation.
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10.1.3.9

Question: “Is online trolling a communication problem for your
organization?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Not a problem

32.00%

16

2

Minor problem

38.00%

19

3

Moderate problem

26.00%

13

4

Serious problem

0.00%

0

5

I don't know

4.00%

2

6

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

50

71

#
1

Field Minimum Maximum Mean
Is online trolling a
communication problem for
your organization?

1.00

5.00

2.06

Std
Variance Count
Deviation
0.97

0.94

50

Analysis:
Not a single participant considered online trolling to be a serious problem, only 26% considered
it a minor problem, and 32% of respondents didn't consider online trolling to be a problem at
all. With a mean score of 2.06 out of 5.0, it is evident that most respondents are not too
concerned about the present state of online trolling.
10.1.3.10

Question: “How successful is your organization in dealing with online
trolling?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Unsuccessful

6.00%

3

2

Somewhat unsuccessful

4.00%

2

5

Somewhat successful

40.00%

20

6

Successful

18.00%

9

7

I don't know

30.00%

15

8

Prefer not to answer

2.00%

1

Total

100%

50

Analysis:
Only 6% of respondents described their company as “unsuccessful” in dealing with online
trolling, and only 4% rated it as “somewhat unsuccessful”. More than half (58%) responded
with “successful” or “somewhat successful”. It is remarkably high that 30% of participants,
responded with “I don’t know”
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10.1.3.11

Question: “Do you expect online trolling to increase in the future?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Not at all

0.00%

0

4

Little

10.00%

5

5

Somewhat

16.00%

8

6

Much

26.00%

13

7

A great deal

38.00%

19

8

I don't know

10.00%

5

9

Prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

50

74

#
1

Field Minimum Maximum Mean
Do you expect online trolling to
increase in the future?

4.00

8.00

6.22

Std
Variance Count
Deviation
1.14

1.29

50

Analysis:
Just as with misinformation, the participants’ assessment of future online trolling was bleak.
Not a single respondent expected that trolling wouldn't increase at all. More than half of the
respondents (64%) expected the increase in online trolling to be “much” or “a great deal”.
10.1.4

DeepFakes and Synthetic Media

10.1.4.1

Question: “Are you familiar with the terms 'DeepFake' and 'Synthetic
Media'?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Never heard of it

18.36%

9

2

Heard about it

16.33%

8

3

I am familiar with the terms

28.57%

14

4

I know quite a bit about it

22.45%

11

5

Prefer not to answer

2.04%

1

6

Only familiar with one of the terms

12.24%

6

Total

100%

49

Analysis:
Neither of these terms had been heard by 18.36% of respondents, 12.24% of participants
responded that they are only familiar with one of the terms and just 22.45% responded that
they “know quite a bit about it”.

10.1.4.2

Cross Tabulation: Knowledge of DeepFakes & Synthetic Media vs. Age

Total Count (Answering)
Are you familiar with the terms
DeepFake and Synthetic Media?
Heard about it
I am familiar with the terms
I know quite a bit about it
Never heard of it
Only familiar with one of the terms
Prefer not to answer

Total

18-24

49.0

3.0

What is your age?
25-32 33-45 46-65
12.0

15.0

19.0

16.3% 0.0% 0.0% 26.7% 21.1%
28.6% 33.3% 25.0% 40.0% 21.1%
22.4% 0.0% 16.7% 20.0% 31.6%
18.4% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 15.8%
12.2% 0.0% 25.0% 6.7% 10.5%
2.0%
0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0%

No answer
0.0

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

76

Analysis:
The general expectation that younger generations are more digitally literate and in touch with
new technology was not reflected in the data. More than half of 46-65 year-olds (52.7%) and
33-45 year-olds (60%) were at least familiar with the terms, vs. only 41.7% of 25-32 year-olds
and 33% of 18-24 year-olds. Not a single respondent in the 18-24 age range responded with “I
know quite a bit about it”.
Note: Participants that answered that they had never heard of the terms “DeepFake” and
“Synthetic Media” were thanked for their participation and rotated out, as it is unlikely that
they would have been able to contribute meaningful responses to the following, more nuanced
questions on the subject matter.
10.1.4.3
Organization

Cross Tabulation: Knowledge of DeepFakes & Synthetic Media vs.

Total Count (Answering)

Are you familiar with the terms
"DeepFake" and "Synthetic Media"?
Heard about it
I am familiar with the terms
I know quite a bit about it
Never heard of it
Only familiar with one of the terms
Prefer not to answer

Total

What does best describe the nature of your organization?
For
Profit
Nonprofit
Political Think Tank
Other No Answer

49.0

20.0

20.0

6.0

2.0

1.0

16.3%
28.6%
22.4%
18.4%
12.2%
2.0%

15.0%
25.0%
25.0%
35.0%
0.0%
0.0%

10.0%
40.0%
20.0%
5.0%
20.0%
5.0%

33.3%
16.7%
33.3%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%

50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

77

Analysis:
While the percentages of respondents who had some knowledge of the terms was quite similar,
the respondents that stood out were those indicating that they “never heard” of the terms. A
remarkable 35% of all participants from for-profit organizations had never even heard of the
terms "DeepFake" and "Synthetic Media". This suggests a significant knowledge gap.
10.1.4.4

Question: “Do you think DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are going to
have positive or negative implications for professional
communicators?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Negative

59.52%

25

2

Somewhat negative

30.95%

13

3

Neither negative nor positive

7.14%

3

4

Somewhat positive

2.38%

1

5

Positive

0.00%

0

6

I don't know

0.00%

0

7

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

42

#

1

Field Minimum Maximum Mean
Do you think DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media are going to
have positive or negative
implications for professional
communicators?

1.00

4.00

1.52

Std
Variance Count
Deviation

0.73

0.54

42

Analysis:
A remarkable 90.47% of respondents felt that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media would have a
“negative” or “somewhat negative” impact on communication professionals. There wasn't a
single respondent that expected the impact to be “positive”, and only 2.38% of respondents
expected the impact to be “somewhat positive”. It is evident that the sentiment concerning
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media is overwhelmingly negative.
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10.1.4.5

Cross Tabulation: DeepFakes & Synthetic Media Implications vs. Organization

What does best describe the nature of your organization?
Political
Think Tank
Total For Profit Nonprofit
Other No Answer
Total Count (Answering)
Do you think DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media are going to have
positive or negative implications for
professional communicators?
Negative
Somewhat negative
Neither negative nor positive
Somewhat positive
Positive
I don't know
I prefer not to answer

42.0

14.0

20.0

5.0

2.0

1.0

59.5%
31.0%
7.1%
2.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

64.3%
21.4%
14.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

55.0%
40.0%
5.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

80.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Analysis:
The expectation that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media would have negative implications was
highest in the ‘political think tanks’ category (80% negative sentiment).
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10.1.4.6

Question: “Do you think DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are currently a
problem for communicators?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Serious problem

19.05%

8

2

Moderate problem

30.95%

13

3

Minor problem

38.10%

16

4

Not at all a problem

7.14%

3

5

I don't know

4.76%

2

6

I prefer not to say

0.00%

0

Total

100%

42
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Analysis:
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are currently regarded only as a “minor” or “moderate”
problem by 69.05% of respondents, while just 19.05% considered it a “serious problem”.
10.1.4.7

Question: “Do you expect DeepFakes and Synthetic Media to become a
problem for communicators in the future?”

82

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Very unlikely

0.00%

0

2

Somewhat unlikely

2.38%

1

3

Neither likely nor unlikely

0.00%

0

4

Somewhat likely

26.19%

11

5

I don't know

7.14%

3

6

I prefer not to say

0.00%

0

8

Very likely

64.29%

27

Total

100%

42

Analysis:
When asked about the future, 64.29% of respondents felt that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media
would “very likely” be a problem in the future, and an additional 26.19% felt that this was
“somewhat likely”. Not a single respondent found it to be unlikely. Only 2.38% considered it
“somewhat unlikely”.
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10.1.4.8
Cross Tabulation: DeepFakes & Synthetic Problem in the Future vs.
Organization

What does best describe the nature of your organization?
Total
For
Nonprofit
Political
Other
No
Profit
Think Tank
Answer
Total Count (Answering)
Do you expect DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media to become a problem for
communicators in the future?
Very unlikely (No Name)
Somewhat unlikely (No Name)
Neither likely nor unlikely (No Name)
Somewhat likely (No Name)
Very likely (No Name)
I don't know (No Name)
I prefer not to say (No Name)

42.0

14.0

20.0

5.0

2.0

1.0

0.0%
2.4%
0.0%
26.2%
64.3%
7.1%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
21.4%
71.4%
7.1%
0.0%

0.0%
5.0%
0.0%
35.0%
60.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
80.0%
20.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Analysis:
The most striking response was that 71.4% of respondents from for-profit organizations saw it
as “very likely” that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media would become a problem in the future,
although 35% of the initial respondents from for-profit organizations had never heard of the
terms.
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10.1.4.9

Question: “When do you expect DeepFakes and Synthetic Media to
become a challenge for your organization?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

0-2 years

26.83%

11

4

3-5 years

31.71%

13

5

5-10 years

4.88%

2

6

More than 10 years

0.00%

0

7

I don't know

29.27%

12

8

I prefer not to answer

2.44%

1

9

Never

4.88%

2

Total

100%

41
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Analysis:
Most respondents (58.54%) expected DeepFakes and Synthetic Media to become a problem for
communicators within the next five years. The high percentage of participants that responded
with “I don’t know” (29.27%) suggests a high level of uncertainty surrounding this issue.
10.1.4.10

Question: “What type of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media do you expect
to be most dominant in the future?”

#

Answer

%

Count

4

Trolling & annoying

39.02%

16

7

I don't know

14.63%

6

8

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

9

Harmless & humorous

7.32%

3

Malicious & criminal

39.02%

16

Total

100%

41

10

86

Analysis:
An equal percentage of respondents (39.02%) expected DeepFakes to be “trolling and
annoying” or “malicious and criminal”. In essence, this means that they expected the vast
majority of its usage to be nefarious, with only 7.32% expecting most applications to be
“harmless and humorous”.

10.1.4.11

Cross Tabulation: Type of DeepFake & Synthetic Media vs. Organization

Total
Total Count (Answering)
What type of DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media do you
expect to be most dominant
in the future?
Harmless & humorous
Trolling & annoying
Malicious & criminal
I don't know
I prefer not to answer

41.0

7.3%
39.0%
39.0%
14.6%
0.0%

What does best describe the nature of your organization?
For
Nonprofit
Political /
Other No Answer
Profit
Think Tank
14.0

20.0

4.0

2.0

1.0

7.1%
35.7%
42.9%
14.3%
0.0%

5.0%
50.0%
30.0%
15.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
75.0%
25.0%
0.0%

50.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Analysis:
As expected, the presumption that DeepFakes would be used for “malicious & criminal”
purposes was highest in political / think tank organizations (75%).
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10.1.4.12

Question: “How likely is it in your opinion that DeepFakes will
undermine public trust and truth-finding?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Extremely unlikely

0.00%

0

2

Unlikely

2.44%

1

3

Neutral

7.32%

3

4

Likely

46.34%

19

5

Extremely likely

41.46%

17

6

I don't know

2.44%

1

7

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

41

88

Analysis:
The majority of respondents (87.8%) indicated that they saw it as “very likely” or “likely” that
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media would undermine public trust and truth-finding. Given that
only 2.44% of respondents regarded this as “unlikely,” the overwhelming negative sentiment is
clear.

10.1.4.13

Question: “How familiar are you with strategies to combat DeepFakes
and Synthetic Media?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Not at all familiar

46.34%

19

2

Slightly familiar

26.83%

11

3

Somewhat familiar

12.20%

5

4

Moderately familiar

12.20%

5

5

Extremely familiar

0.00%

0

6

I don't know

2.44%

1

7

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

41

Analysis:
Less than half of all respondents (46.34%) indicated that they were “not at all familiar” with
strategies to combat DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. An additional 26.83% indicated that they
were only “slightly familiar”. Not a single respondent felt that they were “extremely familiar”
and only 12.2% felt “moderately familiar”.
10.1.4.14

Cross Tabulation: Familiarity with Combat Strategies vs. Organization

Total Count (Answering)
How familiar are you with
strategies to combat DeepFakes
and Synthetic Media?
Not at all familiar (No Name)
Slightly familiar (No Name)
Somewhat familiar (No Name)
Moderately familiar (No Name)
Extremely familiar (No Name)
I don't know (No Name)
I prefer not to answer (No Name)

Total

ForProfit

NonProfit

Political /
Think
Tank

Other

No
Answer

41.0

14.0

20.0

4.0

2.0

1.0

46.3%
26.8%
12.2%
12.2%
0.0%
2.4%
0.0%

57.1%
21.4%
14.3%
7.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

40.0%
30.0%
10.0%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
50.0%
25.0%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
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Analysis:
The response “not at all familiar” was highest in for-profit organizations (57.1%) and 21.4%
responded with “slightly familiar”. Political think tanks seem to fare best.
10.1.4.15

Question: “Is your organization's leadership aware of DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Not at all aware

7.32%

3

2

Slightly aware

4.88%

2

3

Somewhat aware

14.63%

6

4

Moderately aware

12.20%

5

5

Extremely aware

14.63%

6

6

I don't know

46.34%

19

7

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

41

Analysis:
Remarkably, 46.34% of participants responded with “I don’t know”.
1.4.16

Question: “Is your organization prepared to deal with DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Completely unprepared

21.95%

9

2

Relatively unprepared

36.59%

15

3

Somewhat prepared

17.07%

7

4

Very prepared

2.44%

1

6

I don't know

19.51%

8

7

I prefer not to answer

2.44%

1

Total

100%

41

Analysis:
More than half of the respondents (58.54%) felt that their organization was “somewhat
unprepared” or “completely unprepared. Another data point that stands out is the relatively
high number of respondents (19.51%) who responded with “I don’t know. Only 2.44% of
respondents felt that they were “very prepared”.
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10.1.4.17

Question: “Are DeepFakes and Synthetic Media factored into your
reputation and crisis communication strategies?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Not a priority

29.27%

12

2

Low priority

29.27%

12

3

Medium priority

9.76%

4

4

High Priority

2.44%

1

5

Essential

4.88%

2

6

I don't know

24.39%

10

7

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

41

94

Analysis:
More than half of the respondents (58.54%) indicated that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media
were “not a priority” or a “low priority” for their organizations’ reputation and crisis strategies.
Again, the high number of “I don’t know” respondents (24.39%) stands out and points to
uncertainty surrounding the issue and a potential knowledge gap.
10.1.4.18

Question: “Does your organization work with experts and consultants
to deal with DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Never

62.50%

25

2

Rarely

10.00%

4

3

Occasionally

5.00%

2

4

On a regular basis

0.00%

0

5

I don't know

22.50%

9

6

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

40

Analysis:
More than half of participants (62.50%) indicated that their organization had never consulted
any outside experts. An additional 22.5% indicated that they “don’t know.
10.1.4.20

Question: “Do you think it would be desirable to ban DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media?”
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#

Answer

%

Count

1

Very undesirable

5.00%

2

4

Undesirable

10.00%

4

5

Neutral

30.00%

12

6

Desirable

27.50%

11

7

Very desirable

22.50%

9

8

I don't know

5.00%

2

9

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

40

Analysis:
Half of the respondents (50%) indicated that they would find it “very desirable” or “desirable”
to ban DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. The response that stood out most was that 30% of
participants had a “neutral” response. The data indicates that most of the respondents either
have a negative expectation of this new technology or haven’t made up their minds.
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10.1.4.21

Question: “Which institution do you think should be in charge of
regulating DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?”

#

Answer

%

Count

1

Government

32.50%

13

2

Online platforms

47.50%

19

3

Neither

7.50%

3

4

I don't know

12.50%

5

5

I prefer not to answer

0.00%

0

Total

100%

40

Analysis:
The majority of respondents (47.50%) felt that online platforms should regulate DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media, followed by 32.50% who thought the government should regulate this new
phenomenon. Only 7.50% of respondents indicated that “neither” should regulate the new
technology.
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10.1.4.22

Cross Tabulation: Which Institutions should regulate vs. Organization

What does best describe the nature of your organization?
Total
Total Count
(Answering)

Which institution do
you think should be in
charge of regulating
DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media?
Government
Online platforms
Neither
I don't know
I prefer not to answer

For
Profit

Nonprofit

Political
Think Tank

Other

No Answer

40.0

14.0

20.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

32.5%
47.5%
7.5%
12.5%
0.0%

50.0%
35.7%
0.0%
14.3%
0.0%

25.0%
50.0%
10.0%
15.0%
0.0%

33.3%
66.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
50.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Analysis:
Remarkably, for-profit organizations are looking more towards the government (50%) to
regulate DeepFakes and Synthetic Media than non-profit organizations (25%) or political think
tanks (33.3%). Think tanks believe that online platforms should take on most of the
responsibility to regulate DeepFakes and Synthetic Media online (66.7%).
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10.2

Analysis of Communicator Interviews

The goal of conducting semi-structured interviews was to expand the data collection
beyond the quantitative data points of the survey and introduce a more exploratory aspect to
the research. Several themes that emerged from the thematic analysis of the data largely
mirror the survey results:

1

THEME

QUOTES

Misinformation and
disinformation will present a
significant challenge for
communicators in the future.

Male, 30s, US non-profit
"The marketplace of ideas(...) is already geared
towards putting people deeper down their own
rabbit holes and shuttling people towards more
extreme positions."
Male, 50s, political think tank
"(The online platforms) have done a terrible job of
fighting disinformation generally, and so I'm very
gloomy about their ability to fight DeepFakes."
Male, 50s, higher education
"That's something that I worry about now, not so
much as something that's going to happen now, but
within five years it's something that we're going to
have to deal with on an occasional to possibly semiregular basis."
Female, 30s, global non-profit
"We are essentially past the point where there is a
marketplace of ideas where everyone can
participate. If you think about what You Tube was
ten years ago, where anybody (…) could just make a
channel and make it about whatever they want and
have fun and communicate and make a community
of whatever niche thing they'd like. You can't really
do that anymore."
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2

Participants are not well
informed on the subject matter
of DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media.

Female, 30s, global non-profit
"I don't think that anybody has really brought up
Deepfakes. (…) These sorts of preemptive
conversations don't happen because we have things
to do."
Female, 30s, global PR agency
"I am not sure about what it is? I'm assuming it has
to do with all of the fake news that are out there."
Female, 20s, US non-profit
"It wasn't until I took the survey that I understood
what the definitions were. (...)Those aren't terms
that I hear that often. It is not something that
crosses my mind."
Female 40s, medical non-profit
"I don't know. This just never really came up on my
radar. It's definitely not something we've discussed
at work."
Female, 40s, US for-profit
Researcher: "Has this specific aspect, in terms of
Deepfakes and Synthetic Media, ever come up ?
Participant: "No, not that I've seen."
Female, 20s, US PR agency
"I'm vaguely aware, I would say."
Male, 50s, political think tank
"I have no idea of the extent to which this
technology is in use."
Male, 60s, higher education
(On Synthetic Media) "That is an application of AI
that I had not heard about before."
Male, 50s, US for-profit
"The topic so exotic that I answered the first
question, saying 'Yes, it's on my radar'. Well, the
reality is, it wasn't on my radar."
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Female, 20s, public health non-profit
"I generally feel that it's not on a lot of people’s
radars."
Female, 20s, US non-profit
"I feel like my literacy is really low on this, and I
would assume probably a lot of people in my
position might not know as much too."
Female, 40s, medical non-profit
"It's very tough to keep up with all of the new
technology and then to assess how much our brand
should really be aware of this."
3

DeepFakes and Synthetic
Female, 30s, global non-profit
Media are currently not high on "Personally, I do not see a lot of conversations within
the priority list.
the organization going on about Deepfakes. There's
lots of conversation about misinformation, but not
about DeepFakes specifically."
Female, 30s, global PR agency
Researcher: Deepfake and synthetic media - has that
ever popped up at your workplace?
Participant: No, never.
Male, 30s, US non-profit
"It's not been something that we've discussed or
have created a crisis plan about or anything like
that."
Female, 40s, medical non-profit
"It would have to hit sort of a critical mass for me to
say 'OK, this is an issue that we really need to keep
on our radar', just because I have such a long list of
(...) threats that are very potential."
Female, 40s, Fintech for-profit
"I think the theme is on the radar, but the specifics
have not really hit us yet. (...)The one main challenge
that I have as a communicator is being in too many
places and not having enough resources to manage
it."
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Male, 50s, higher education
"Our IT staff is all of maybe seven people at this
point. (...) I know that they've had to deal with
traditional security issues. I could see novel issues
being a real problem out of nowhere."
Male, 50s, political think tank
"We have not thought about or even talked about
how you would fight a DeepFake attack and,
honestly, have no idea how one would proceed in
doing so."
Male, 50s, higher education
"The technology they (organizations) are investing in
is really customer identification and customer
management. (...) It's basically selling stuff. "
Female, 20s, higher education
"It is definitely something that is not a top priority
from where I stand. "
Female, 20s, US non-profit
"It's not something that we talk about or think
about. Maybe that's just because we're so busy all
the time, so we don't have much time to think into
the future. We are mostly reactive."
4

Communicators have a mostly
negative sentiment towards
DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media.

Female, 30s, global non-profit
"I would go every year to the Mozilla Festival and go
to lots of talks where I would usually do a talk on
misinformation or about gender gap related things
or intersectionality. (...) I am kind of just staying
ahead of what people are doing these days, so I am
personally very concerned about DeepFakes
especially."
Male, 30s, US non-profit
"There is the scary aspect of not being able to
basically believe your eyes anymore. It intersects
with everything we're doing online nowadays
anyway; you have to be incredibly skeptical of
absolutely everything you see, and it's pretty
exhausting to do that."
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Female, 20s, US PR agency
"I think it's terrifying to be completely honest. I
think that's just so scary from a corporate
perspective, from a personal perspective, from any
kind of perspective."
Male, 50s, political think tank
"I'm deeply worried about it infecting my field of
politics. If you're running for Congress and your
opponent has a video of you, (…) claiming you're a
pedophile or saying a terrible racist slur that's going
to be unbelievably difficult to push back on."
Male, 50s, higher education
"It wouldn't be very hard to get enough seed
information (...) to construct something where you
put together a 10-second video and suddenly it
sounds like they're saying something.”
Female, 30s, global non-profit
"I have a lot of (…) tech bro friends who think that
DeepFakes are the best thing ever. (…) I'm not very
optimistic about that."
5

DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media are seen as a potential
reputation threat.

Female, 30s, global non-profit
"I still think that it will be a reputational issue for
women, and I think that we are screwed."
Female, 40s, Fintech for profit
"It's all about (...) reputation, trust and also
information. It could be damaging to our customers
as well."
Male, 50s, higher education
"You're never going to gain 100% of your brand
integrity back. Maybe 99, but never 100."

104

Female, 30s, global non-profit
"As a reputation manager – this would be a death
sentence for an employee in a lot of companies. (...).
I'm concerned about women. I'm concerned about
people who are trans. (...) There's so many pitfalls to
how that can end your career and your livelihood,
especially for people who are not cis men. "
6

Communicators expect trolls
and amateurs to be the main
source of DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media.

Female, 30s, global non-profit
"I think definitely amateurs and trolls. (...) Like, you
know, let's Deepfake AOC. Let's Deepfake Catherine
Mayer. (...) There is a very vocal subculture of people
who just do this all day and want to put (the faces
of) famous people or their girlfriends, or like women
who rejected them in high school - people onto
pornstar models."
Female, 30s, global PR agency
"Yeah, definitely trolls."
Female, 20s, US non-profit
"I would say probably amateurs and trolls, but
people who are really good at the Internet—you
know, people who spend a lot of time on Reddit and
the same people who were trying to hack the
GameStop stock market."
Female, 20s, US PR agency
"Trolls or people that have been disenfranchised by
someone or pissed off in any kind of way."
Male, 50s, higher education
"I think the vast majority that would affect my
particular institution is going to be amateur stuff"
Male, 50s, US for-profit
"Probably (...) amateurs and trolls."
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There were several additional insights that emerged from the communicator interviews
that were not apparent in the survey data.

7

THEME

QUOTE

Participants’ biggest concern is
not about DeepFakes targeting
their organizations as a whole, but
about DeepFakes targeting
specific individuals within their
organizations.

Female, 30s, global non-profit
"If you are a woman and you have any amount of
fame, like our organization’s last executive
director. She was kind of like a poster child. Like,
there was a cult of personality around her and
there was a little bit of concern from me and a few
people in the trust and safety team. (...) I was
concerned for her because she's blonde and she's
smart and she's a CEO. I am concerned about
DeepFakes."
Male, 50s, political think tank
"I worry that people will be abused by this.
Individually and collectively, it'll be used for
revenge against you."
Male, 50s, higher education
"When it comes to particularly social media and
how easy it is to spread rumors, we've had a few
incidents with somebody claiming to be a former
student, because they have an Instagram account
that's not linked to a real name, saying XYZ
professor was a terrible person."

8

Participants are fearful of the
potential fallout from DeepFakes
and Synthetic Media but never
consider that their own company
could be targeted.

Female, 30s, global PR agency
"You know that this Deepfake can damage the
image of many corporations. But my concern that
that's going to happen in reality - no, I'm not."
Male, 30s, US non-profit
"Honestly, I don't think we're high profile enough
to be targeted for something like that, I think, you
know, maybe if I worked for a big NGO (...) or
something like that."
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Female, 40s, medical non-profit
"It has not impacted my work at all, and maybe
because we (…) really deal with science and facts,
and we also tend to deal with very mainstream
reporters."
Female, 20s, US PR agency
"I don't know if they would target me or my
agency, specifically."
9

Participants suggest that the best
crisis response to a DeepFake
could be to go on a public
education offensive.

Female, 40s, Fintech for - profit
"You could even have a contest like 'Send the
craziest thing you know'. 'What's the craziest
misinformation we've seen this year?' "
Female, 20s, US PR agency
"I think you would immediately just have to go for
explaining what a DeepFake is, because I think if
you start immediately going the apology route,
you look guilty."

10

Participants indicate that decision
makers are willing to listen to
concerns, but then often don’t act
on it.

Female, 30s, global non-profit
"There's so much stalling in the nonprofit sphere.
There's a lot of like hurry up and wait up and
bureaucracy that I couldn't get people in a room
long enough to, like, think about the problem."
Female, 30s, global PR agency
"They are pretty good at listening to any ideas we
have. Do you think that we will take steps to avoid
it? No, I don’t think so."
Male, 30s, US non-profit
"As for DeepFakes, particularly, I think it's so far off
their radar. They probably wouldn't consider it."
Female, 20s, US PR agency
"I don't think they would seriously think someone
would try it with our clients. I don't think they
would see it as a pervasive issue."
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11

Participants cite the messaging
surrounding the Covid-19
pandemic as an example of how
difficult it has become to counter
misinformation and
disinformation.

Female, 40s, medial non-profit
"I think that COVID has brought up this issue
where information has gotten really politicized
versus hearing the truth behind clinical trials and
making vaccines."
Male, 50s, Political Think Tank
"It will become virtually impossible to convince
people that the truth is true. (...) We're seeing this
(...) both in politics, but even in public health
around the coronavirus."
Male, 50s, higher education
"We're seeing a lot of that now with just stuff
around COVID (...) especially the financially
charged areas of being able to promote products
that have very little to do with medical treatments
and making money off of that and finding those
margins where people's belief and their need to
believe certain things makes them very vulnerable
to (...) disinformation or misinformation
campaigns."
Male, 50s, US for-profit
"When you look at the crisis we're in, with the
vaccinations right now. Just misinformation as a
whole, it's just incredibly detrimental to society.
So, it is a big, big issue."
Female, 20s, public health non-profit
"I could go on for (...) hours about COVID and how
it was completely mishandled. (...) Why can't we
just do something that's more preventive, more
proactive rather than reactive?"
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10.3

Analysis of Expert Interviews

The thematic analysis of the expert interviews revealed several themes:

1

THEME

QUOTE

The Marketplace of Ideas and the
Marketplace of Attentioncxxiii are
broken.

Male, 30s, countermeasure expert
"We use images and videos in every aspect of our
daily life. Image fabrication and synthesis tools by
itself are not a problem, it is the maligned use of
them that is a problem. We're talking about, not
just the technology problem, (…) it's a “whole of
society” problem, our over reliance on digital
images and videos to make decisions."
Male, 30s, countermeasure expert
"These claims that 'Oh DeepFakes will end trust
online'. I think we're already there, to be honest.
The marketplace of ideas (...) is already so
incredibly broken. (...) We’ve done such a horrible
job of combating misinformation and
disinformation as it is."
Male, 30s, policy expert
"Deepfakes provide an asymmetric advantage in
the marketplace of attention toward non-true
things, non-real things. And that has significant
impacts on the level to which the marketplace of
attention actually rewards ideas and puts attention
toward the things that actually matter."

2

There is a lack of awareness and
education in the communication
field.

Male, 20s, policy expert
I've talked to people at the New York Times about
Deepfakes and they’re like the quantum
communication shop. If they feel unprepared, I
can't even imagine what your average Fortune
500—which is not geared towards this sort of
thing, and probably either contracts out much of
its communications work or does it in-house with,
like, a relatively small team. I don't think that those
people are going to be remotely ready. It strikes
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me that there's, like, a very, very significant
disconnect. It is almost a pitiful level of readiness, I
think, across most of the private sector."
Male, 20s, cyber security and DeepFake expert
"I am genuinely concerned about the capability of
information warfare that that can be waged using
Deepfakes when government agencies and highly
skilled individuals are involved.”
Male, 20s, cyber security and DeepFake expert
"I think there is a more reactive approach than
there should be. I think everybody should be more
proactive. I think they don't understand the value,
potentially of securing themselves against these
changes in technology."
3

Attacks on individuals, mainly
through the use of pornographic
DeepFakes, will be the biggest
challenge for professional
communicators.

Male, 30s, countermeasure expert
"Right now (…) DeepFakes have not been as much
of a factor in society, with the obvious exception of
non-consensual porn, which has victimized a lot of
women."
Male, 20s, policy expert
"There's also like the very, very real harm right
now of DeepFake porn and things of that nature:
basically, the use of DeepFakes, not in some sort of
like political grand strategy, but as a means of
humiliating or bullying or harassing somebody."
Male, 20s, cyber security and DeepFake expert
"From what I know about Deepfakes (...), the vast
majority of uses for DeepFakes has been
pornographic and adult-oriented. This opens a
whole bunch of morality and ethics questions that,
I feel as a scientist and a researcher in the field of
cyber security, I don't have the answers to. I don't
think anybody, at the moment, understands the
potential impact, the actual harm that it does to an
individual."
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4

Technical access to DeepFakes will Male, 30s, countermeasure expert
get much easier.
"What we're seeing is a rise in the democratization
of the technology. (…) I think we're moving from
the 'You need a lot of expertise', camp and 'A lot of
computing' camp to a much more, sort of like,
'script ready', (...) off-the-shelf code, where
anybody with the right tools they find on the
Internet can throw together something halfway
decent. I think, like, the ultimate thing that most
concerns me is the world in which DeepFakes are
more or less plug and play."
Male, 20s, cyber security and DeepFake expert
" DeepFake-generating tools don’t require large
amounts of expertise. It's something that literally
anyone can do. As less expertise is required to
make DeepFakes and it becomes cheaper, to the
point where they are just super cheap, then we
will start seeing issues with disinformation
campaigns being run using Deepfakes, in my
opinion."
Male, 20s, DeepFake Researcher
"If you want to create a DeepFake, it helps to have
at least a basic understanding of coding. But that
means that the entry barrier for DeepFakes has
gone down (...) from you knowing machine
learning to you knowing coding. As long as you
understand how basic code works, how to
manipulate things, how to Google things, you can
actually create DeepFakes of anyone, anywhere. If
you want to have a fast DeepFake that does not
need to be perfect, in terms of quality, two hours,
often just one hour, is sufficient."
Male, 30s, Policy Expert
“I expect that, within 10 years, this will be
ubiquitous and the quality of it will just look as
good as reality. There is a decent chance that there
will be the capability to be completely
undetectable. Like, within 10 years, I think that is
not an unlikely scenario.”
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5

Effective countermeasures require Male, 30s, countermeasure expert
too much expertise and too many "There are, unfortunately, no quick fixes."
resources to be administered by
communicators and most IT
departments.
Male, 20s, policy expert
"What is sustainable, is that your in-house
communications team has access to experts a
phone call away. Some sort of strategic response
firm that specializes in DeepFakes and understands
the legal aspects and understands how to
negotiate with people who might be using
DeepFakes for blackmail, or whatever."

6

100% protection against the
malicious use of DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media is impossible.

Male, 30s, countermeasure expert
"Image detection, looking at a picture or a video to
determine if it is real or fake, is virtually impossible
in real time and on internet scale. (…) I don't think
there will ever be 100% security against fraud
online. Our banks do get hacked into. (...) But the
idea is to make it harder for bad actors and give
consumers at least a better level of protection."
Male, 20s, policy expert
"And, I think DeepFakes (...) are cyber security
problems. (...) One of the reasons I think it's useful
to think of them in those terms is that cyber
security is fundamentally defined by this cat and
mouse game. Where you have one side, you know,
those of us playing defense and we're trying to
keep systems secure. And then on the other side
are adversaries (who are) constantly learning,
constantly getting better, figuring out, you know,
what your strategy is and adapting to it and trying
to sort of undermine it. (…) Speaking as an expert
in the cyber security area, I can say that it is not a
matter of if you get hacked, but a matter of when
you get hacked."
Male, 20s, cyber security and DeepFake expert
"DeepFakes are definitely part of the cyber
security field, especially as far as corporations are
concerned. (…) In the phishing domain there have
been studies that demonstrate that no matter how
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much you educate a certain set of people, they just
don't learn and they keep falling for it and they try
multiple different education methods, different
tools and different techniques. They don't learn."
7

It is virtually impossible to address
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media
wholesale from a regulation point
of view.

Male, 30s, countermeasure expert
"I don't envision a world where (regulation) is
mandated."
Male, 20s, policy expert
"It's a really tough thing to regulate on the part of
the state. Because there are First Amendment
concerns, particularly when you're dealing with
ambiguities, and, you know, authenticity.
In general, when it comes to questions of speech,
(...)a lot of lies are protected by the First
Amendment, and I think it's probably pretty
challenging to have a broad, overarching law or
regulation put into place by the government that
covers most or all sorts of DeepFake content that
we'd be concerned about, like, for example,
disinformation, which is notoriously hard to
counter."
Male, 30s, Policy Expert
"A lot of the actors who might be deploying these
maliciously might be outside of the jurisdiction of
the regulator."
Male, 20s, cyber security and DeepFake expert
"How could you possibly enforce a ban on that?
It's not possible. (...)The cat’s out of the bag. The
DeepFakes are out there, so if you just blanket ban
DeepFakes, it's not going to work. So, I think a
100% blanket ban is not exactly the right answer,
especially when you start encroaching on like, well,
‘What about my right to make memes’, which is
going to be an argument that somebody is going to
make right?"
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Male, 20s, policy expert
"A lot of the times you're trying to convince the
platforms to get on board and move in a certain
direction, and, obviously, you know as Congress
and the agencies have certainly figured out, the
only way to get them to do that sometimes is to
threaten or to bully them."

11

Discussion
There is only very limited data concerning the literacy of professional communicators in

the area of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. As this is an exploratory, forward-looking research
study, the literature review serves mostly as a framing device to provide context and discuss
factors that contribute to making DeepFakes and Synthetic Media such a potential threat.
The creation and distribution of malicious DeepFakes and Synthetic Media follows the
"bottleneck principle", which means that several contributing factors all need to be present for
this technology to become a communication challenge. As outlined in the literature review, all
of those factors are currently present, or will be present in the near future (see Figure below).
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11.1

Digital Literacy and Misinformation
DeepFakes and Synthetic media are a subcategory of misinformation that lends itself

well to malicious use and needs to be evaluated in that context. Thus, the research study
started by exploring the digital literacy of communication professionals and their outlook on
misinformation and disinformation.
From a demographic point of view, 18–65-year-olds were represented in the
communicator survey, with a slight underrepresentation of 18-24 year-olds (5.45%) (see
10.1.1.1). The majority of the participants (68.51%) had more than 9 years of experience in the
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field, and 44.44% had more than 15 years of experience. This validates the survey data from an
experience point of view (see 10.1.1.2).
Generally, the respondents had a high degree of confidence in their own digital literacy,
with 42.59% rating it as “very good” and 50% as “excellent” (see 10.1.2.1). Contrary to the
stereotype of younger generations having a higher degree of organic digital literacy, the data
was inconclusive, with older generations expressing a higher rate of confidence in their digital
literacy than younger generations (see 10.1.2.2). This could either mean that digital literacy
grows with experience, or, as this was a self-assessment, that older generations simply
overestimate their own digital literacy.
At the same time, the survey participants gave themselves relatively low ratings when it
came to knowledge of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, with 16.3% responding that they had
never heard of the terms, and only 22.4% expressing confidence in their knowledge on the
subject matter (see 10.1.4.1). This was also reflected in the discrepancy between the mean
value for “digital literacy” (0.8 / max value 1) vs. the significantly lower mean value for
“knowledge of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media” (0.50 / max value 1). Again, contrary to
expectations, younger generations did not have a higher level of knowledge in the subject
matter (see 10.1.4.2).
Considering that knowledge of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media needs to be regarded as
a part of digital literacy, it suggests that the respondents were overconfident in self-assessing
their digital literacy or didn’t understand the context at all.
Only 5.88% of respondents indicated that misinformation was “no problem” for
their organization (see 10.1.3.3), and 52.92% “agree” or “somewhat agree” that misinformation

116

was a substantial challenge to their organization’s reputation and brand image (see 10.1.3.6).
This stands in stark contrast to only 26.92% of respondents stating that their organization
provided written guidelines on how to deal with misinformation (see 10.1.3.1). Think tanks and
non-profits, especially, seem to be lacking in that regard (see 10.1.3.2). Another interesting
finding was that 52.94% of respondents “agree” or “somewhat agree” that misinformation
factors into their organization's communication strategy (see 10.1.3.7). This suggests a certain
degree of dissonance or misalignment, as the same group indicated that only a quarter of
organizations had written guidelines concerning misinformation. The data suggests that
organizations are well aware of the challenges posed by misinformation but have failed to
enact written policies. This constitutes a significant blind spot in the communication strategy. If
this shortfall is not addressed, it is likely that this lack of guidance and documentation will
continue when it comes to addressing the future challenge of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media.
One explanation for the lack of documentation can be found in the communicator interview
data, which showed that while decision makers are generally open to listening to concerns
about new technology threats, they rarely take tangible action or allocate resources—unless
there is a precedent or immediate threat. An additional aspect that contributes to the lack of
written strategy seems to be a certain level of cognitive dissonance within communicators, who
are generally fearful of the advance of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, but never consider that
their own organization could be targeted.
Even in the absence of written guidelines, most respondents expressed a high degree of
confidence in the current effectiveness of their organizations in dealing with misinformation,
with 71.76% of respondents indicating that they were “somewhat effective” or “effective” (see
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10.1.3.4).
However, the picture looks much gloomier when it comes to the future of
misinformation, with 94.22% of respondents being at least “somewhat concerned” about the
future impact of misinformation and 38.46% stating that they were “extremely concerned” (see
10.1.3.5). This negative outlook was mirrored in the communicator interview data. This points
to a significant level of uncertainty. In the interviews, both communicators and experts
described the "Marketplace of Ideas" and the "Marketplace of Attention" as being broken. As
an example, multiple interview participants, communicators and experts alike, cited what they
saw as failed messaging during the Covid-19 pandemic, in which government and health care
institutions struggled to counter an onslaught of misinformation.
As far as online trolling, the collective sentiment of communicators was that it does not,
currently, constitute a major communication problem (see 10.1.3.9), and most respondents
found their organization to be successful in dealing with online trolls (see 10.1.3.10). However,
again, the respondents’ sentiment towards the future was decidedly much more negative. Not
a single respondent stated that they didn't expect online trolling to increase at all, and 64% of
respondents expected online trolling to increase “much” or “a great deal” (see 10.1.1.11). This
expectation was mirrored in the interview data, in which most communicators indicated that
they expected DeepFakes and Synthetic Media to mainly originate from amateurs and trolls, as
opposed to professionals and state players (see 10.2).
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11.2

Deepfakes and Synthetic Media
In the survey, 18.36% of all communicators indicated that they had never heard of the

terms. Only 22.45% of participants responded that they knew “quite a bit about it” (see
10.1.4.1). A surprising 35% of respondents, working in for-profit organizations, had never heard
of the terms (see 10.1.4.1). DeepFakes and Synthetic Media do not represent the majority of
the misinformation currently circulated online. However, considering that this technology has
been covered in the media for several years, and after the viral Obama DeepFake video was
published by Buzzfeed in April 2018cxxiv, the data suggests a significant knowledge gap. The
interview data mirrored the lack of knowledge on the subject. One interesting aspect was that
several communicators initially indicated being knowledgeable about DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media but, when presented with the official definitions by the interviewer, conceded that they
had wrongfully assumed that DeepFakes were other aspects of misinformation. This indicates
that the number of participants who did not know the terms had been underestimated.
This data was supported by expert assessments concerning communicator literacy in
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, which one expert described as an “almost pitiful level of
readiness”.
The results were remarkable when contrasted with the previously mentioned fact that
62% of participants “somewhat agree” or “agree” that their organization was well prepared to
deal with misinformation (see 10.1.3.8), because this should also extend to DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media. At the same time, 21.95% of participants stated that their organization was
“completely unprepared” to deal with DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. Only 2.44% felt that
they were “very prepared” (see 10.1.4.16). This lack of preparedness was alluded to several
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times in the interviews, by communicators who indicated that the subject had never been
discussed, or even been mentioned, at their workplace.
While 46.34% of all communicators responded that they were “not at all
familiar” with strategies to combat DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, an additional 26.83%
indicated that they are only “slightly familiar”. Not a single respondent stated that they were
“extremely familiar” (see 10.1.4.13). This indicates a clear knowledge gap and lack of
preparedness. Again, for-profit organizations stood out with the lowest response rate, with
57.1% of participants stating that they were “not at all familiar” and 21.4% indicating that they
were only “slightly familiar” (see 10.1.4.14). Given that the main sample pool of for-profit
organizations consisted of Fortune500 companies that should have ample resources, it is clear
that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are not at the top of their priority lists.
When asked if their leadership was aware of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, 46.34% of
participants stated “I don’t know” (see 10.1.2.3). This points to a high level of uncertainty and
suggests a low level of communication within the organizations, which is likely to prevent an
effective response to malicious uses of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media.
This sentiment is mirrored in 21.95% of communicators who felt that their organizations
were “completely unprepared” and another 36.59% who stated that they were “relatively
unprepared” to deal with DeepFakes and Synthetic Media (see 10.1.4.16).
As far as reputation and crisis management is concerned, 58.54% of all participants
indicated that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media were either “not a priority” (29.27%) or a “low
priority” (29.27%) (see 10.1.14.17). This is remarkable when contrasted with data gathered
from the interviews with communicators, in which participants identified DeepFakes and
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Synthetic Media as a potential threat to reputations. One possible explanation for this
contradiction is the low level of literacy on the subject matter, which results in uncertainty,
confusion, and, subsequently, a reluctance to act.
The lack of knowledge on the subject matter and the lack of preparedness is also
surprising, considering that 64.29% of all participants stated that they considered it to be “very
likely” for DeepFakes and Synthetic Media to become a problem for communicators in the
future. Another 26.19% considered it “somewhat likely”. Not a single participant deemed it
“very unlikely” for this new challenge not to become a future challenge for communicators (see
10.1.4.7).
Interestingly, interview data showed that most communicators’ biggest concern was not
about DeepFakes targeting their organization as a whole but about DeepFakes targeting specific
individuals within the organization. Multiple participants specifically voiced concerns about the
malicious targeting of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community with pornographic
DeepFakes. The fallout from these kinds of personal attacks would extend far beyond the
workplace into the private sphere. Those concerns were mirrored by data gathered during
expert interviews.
More than half of communicators (59.52%) thought that DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media would have negative implications for them, and another 30.95% thought the impact
would be “somewhat negative”. Not a single respondent thought the impact would be
“positive”, and only 2.38% thought it could be “somewhat positive” (see 10.1.4.4). With a mean
of 0.3 (out of 1), it is clear that the sentiment concerning DeepFakes and Synthetic Media is
overwhelmingly negative.
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The majority of participants (87.8%) stated that they felt it was either “extremely likely”
(41.46%) or “likely” (46.34%) that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media would undermine public
trust and truth-finding (see 10.1.4.12), which would inherently create significant challenges for
communicators.
In terms of a timeline, 26.83% of respondents expected DeepFakes and Synthetic Media
to become a challenge within two years, and another 31.71% expected it to become a challenge
within five years. Almost a third of participants (29.27%), responded with “I don’t know”, which
points to a very high level of uncertainty, possibly caused by an overall lack of knowledge
concerning the subject matter (see 10.1.4.9). The data indicates that communicators expected
this to be a problem within the near future. However, the data also showed that the majority of
organizations are not adequately prepared and are not currently taking the necessary steps to
improve their literacy and strategies.
The expert interview data confirmed that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are likely to
become an increasing communication challenge soon, as technical access will reach plug-andplay status, due to advances in computing power and codecs being shared online via platforms,
such as Github. One expert pointed to an ongoing study in which tech-savvy amateurs, who had
no prior expertise in creating DeepFakes, were given open-source software and minimal
instructions to create a DeepFake video of a particular sentence. That study showed that,
within two hours, 60% of the participants were able to create a DeepFake video clip that could
pass on a low-resolution cell phone monitor.
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Experts stated that, in the near future, technical expertise would no longer be required
for malicious players seeking to create DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, due to an expanding
market of online service providers that create custom DeepFakes at low cost.

11.3

Solutions and Countermeasures
Experts agreed that DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are too complex of a technical issue

to be addressed by communication or Information Technology (IT) departments of individual
organizations. They suggested forming, or collaborating with, a support network of experts and
specialty consultants from different groups: standards organizations, such as the Coalition for
Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA); other efforts, such as Darpa’s Media Forensics
Program (Medifor); or even joint projects by tech companies, such as the “DeepFake Detection
Challenge” (see IV - 8).
However, in the survey with communication professionals, 62.50% of all respondents
stated that their organizations “never” worked with experts or consultants who specialize in
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. Another 22.50% answered “I don’t know”. Not a single
participant responded with “on a regular basis” (see 10.1.4.18). This shows a clear alignment
problem between communication departments and experts that needs to be addressed.
Roughly one-fifth of survey participants (22.50%) indicated that it would be “very
desirable” to ban DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, and another 27.50% deemed it to be
“desirable”. Only 5% of respondents thought it would be “undesirable” to institute a ban (see
10.1.4.20). In contrast, experts did not think it would be viable to ban DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media, both from a policy and technical point of view. Another concern voiced by several
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experts were legal hurdles, such as First Amendment issues that would make it virtually
impossible to instate a blanket ban on the technology in the U.S. One expert stated that the
progress of the technology is difficult to track and regulate, because much of it is happening
outside of the regular channels of academia and commerce.
Another discrepancy between communicators and experts was the overall sentiment
concerning DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, as far as positive applications are concerned.
Communicators showed very low confidence in potential positive uses. The majority of
respondents (59.52%) thought that implications would be “negative” and 30.95% thought that
implications would be “somewhat negative. Not a single respondent regarded the new
technology as “positive” for communication professionals (see 10.1.4.4). This negative
sentiment was mirrored in the interviews with communicators, in which participants described
the new technology as “terrifying” or “scary”.
The analysis of expert interviews revealed a much more diverse range of opinions
compared to the interviews with communication professionals. The viewpoints mainly diverged
when it came to predictions about the effects of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on
communication professionals and society as a whole. One expert predicted a future with almost
exclusively positive applications, such as automatic language translation, marketing,
entertainment and human resources. He listed examples, such as a CEO of a global company
being able to simultaneously address a diverse audience in different languages or replacing
current customer support chat bots with realistic DeepFake avatars that can mimic human
customer support agents.

124

On the other end of the spectrum were predictions of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media
contributing to an Infocalypse: a state in which the information sphere will degrade to a point
where institutions are no longer able to function effectively. DeepFakes could contribute to a
level of ubiquitous misinformation noise that would make it impossible to elevate salient issues
to the level of urgency they deserve. This means it would be impossible to gather consensus
around vital issues, such as addressing a global pandemic or climate change, with devastating,
long-term consequences ranging from civil unrest and war, to an environment hostile to human
existence.
While expert opinions on the potential negative fallout from DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media diverged, all experts expressed confidence in the potential for constructive uses of the
technology, such as in the educational, medical and entertainment fields. The uncertainty and
fear communicators expressed towards DeepFakes and Synthetic Media could potentially
prevent them from taking advantage of the positive applications of this new technology. It
could also create an alignment gap between experts, consultants and communication
professionals who have very different sentiments and perspectives, as it pertains to engaging
with the new technology.
When it comes to combatting the malicious use of DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media, experts disagreed concerning the potential efficacy of countermeasures. Some were
confident that online platforms would reign in DeepFakes and Synthetic Media. On the other
end of the spectrum, participants posited that it was virtually impossible to implement
DeepFake detection in real time and on an internet-wide, global scale.
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All participants, communicators and experts alike, identified education and partnering
with experts as the most efficient countermeasures against the malicious use of DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media. Some communicators suggested a counter-offensive approach as a possible
crisis communication strategy, such as hosting a “Show me your craziest DeepFake challenge”
to push back against malicious players and educate stakeholders.
In terms of using education as a countermeasure, several experts pointed to alreadyexisting cyber threats, such as phishing, that persist despite widespread education efforts. One
expert pointed out the need to find a middle ground between experts and communicators in
terms of publishing findings and best practices. He stated that there is currently a dichotomy
between complex academic articles and shallow press releases. The participant called for the
publication of more middle-ground white papers that can serve as educational material for nonexperts, while retaining enough in-depth substance to engage communicators in a meaningful
way.
There was also a recommendation to form a worldwide, non-profit body, modeled after
the World Health Organization (WHO), that would be staffed around to the clock, to assist
when nation-states or large organizations encountered a safety risk. This could be particularly
useful in countering the malicious uses of technology in countries that lack proper resources.
Several experts suggested establishing a video certification chain similar to The Coalition
for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA)cxxv. However, one participant expressed that
image and video certification would inevitably lead to privacy problems, as the embedded
metadata, such as authorship information, time and place, could be used for surveillance by
unauthorized players or authoritarian regimes.

126

12.

Conclusion

Misinformation is already one of the most salient challenges for professional
communicators. The new technology of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media has the potential to
further erode the infosphere, to the point where the ubiquitous noise of misinformation leads
to an Infocalypse: a state in which it is no longer possible to discern falsehoods from the truth.
This research study confirms the hypothesis that communication professionals are unprepared
for the advancement of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media, both in terms of digital literacy and
communication strategies. Furthermore, the study highlights an alignment gap between
communication professionals and experts, specifically in the areas of education,
countermeasures and the overall sentiment concerning this new technology.
There is clearly a need for organizations to bolster their education efforts and integrate
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media into their curricula, as well as adjust their reputation and crisis
management strategies. There also appears to be a need for more written guidelines and interdepartmental communication concerning the handling of all aspects of misinformation within
the organizations.
Professional communicators should consult with experts and specialists to tie into larger
infrastructures of academic and government institutions, as well as private companies that are
working on tech and policy standards to combat the malicious use of DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media.
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In turn, academia and experts need to ensure that literature and white papers are
published, in a user-friendly format, that explain and address challenges in detail but forgo the
sometimes-uninviting technical jargon commonly used in academic and scientific writing.
By alleviating the uncertainty and fear currently surrounding DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media, communicators would be able to embrace the myriad of positive ways in which this new
technology could be used, while subsequently preparing themselves for the inevitable instances
when it will be used maliciously.
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APPENDIX – A: Qualtrix Survey Questions Communication Professionals
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Baruch College
Corporate Communication Department
COM9991 Master's Thesis in Corporate Communication
Title of Research Study: The Effects of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on Communication
Professionals
Principal Investigator: Axel Ebermann, MA in Corporate Communication Student
Email: axel.ebermann@baruchmail.cuny.edu
Advisor: Dr. Minna Logemann, Assistant Professor, Department of Communication Studies
Minna.Logemann@baruch.cuny.edu
Qualtrix Survey Questions Communication Professionals
Introduction
My name is Axel Ebermann. I am a graduate student in corporate communication at Baruch
College / City University of New York. This survey is designed to gather data for my master’s
thesis research project titled “The Effects of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on
Communication Professionals”. This survey consists of 37 questions and will take
approximately 15 minutes to complete. It is fully anonymous.
Feel free to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer.
Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or concerns:
axel.ebermann@baruchmail.cuny.edu
Please kindly read the consent form to participate in this survey.
You are being asked to participate in this research study because your knowledge and
experience in the corporate communications field makes you a great asset for my research.
Your participation is voluntary. There are no direct benefits to you for participating in the current research. However, your
participation will help advance knowledge about the possible effects of DeepFakes and Synthetic media
on professional communicators and consequently benefit society as a whole.
If you agree you will be asked to participate in a survey consisting of 37
questions. Questions will revolve around the issue of misinformation and disinformation in the
information sphere, how DeepFakes and Synthetic Media may change the dynamics in that field
and which measures could be used to combat the malicious use of this new phenomenon.
The completion of this survey will take approximately 15 minutes. If you feel uncomfortable with
any specific questions you will be able to skip them. You can also end the survey at any point if
you choose to do so.
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As with any internet research there is a minimal risk of a breach of confidentiality. To mitigate
this risk, all surveys will be conducted through the software platform Qualtrics and will be
anonymous as the “anonymize response” button will be marked off so that personal information
is not recorded, and the contact association is removed. I am the only one who has access to my
Qualtrics username and account, and any data exported will not have participant’s direct
identifiers attached. The data will be stored on my personal computer.
The final data will be stored on my adviser's password protected computer on campus for three
years.
1) I have read the consent form and want to participate in this survey.
Yes

No

“no” > end of survey
2) Are you working as a full-time employee in the communications field?
Yes

No

“no” > end of survey
3) What is your age?
Under 18

18-24

25-32

33-45

45-65

prefer not to answer

“under 18” > end of survey
4) How many years of work experience do you have in the communication field?
1-3

4-8

9-15

more than 15

prefer not to answer

5) How would you rate your digital literacy?
Likert Scale 1-10

prefer not to answer

6) How would you rate the digital literacy of your organization’s decision makers?
Likert 1-10

prefer not to answer

7) What does best describe the nature of your organization
For Profit | Non-for-Profit | Political / Think Tank | skip question
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8) Please describe your industry
Dropdown menu:
Agriculture, Forestry, Mining [primary sector]
Industrials (Manufacturing, Construction, etc.)
Energy, Utilities
Transport, Logistics
Media, Creative Industries
Data Infrastructure, Telecom
Healthcare
Education
Life Sciences
Retail / ecommerce
Hospitality, Food, Leisure Travel
Public Service, Social Service
Financial Services
Professional Services (Law, Consulting, etc.)
Other
skip question
9) Does your organization have written guidelines on how to deal with misinformation?
Yes | No I don’t know | prefer not to answer
10) Does your organization provide training on how to deal with misinformation?
Yes | No | I don’t know | prefer not to answer
11) Is misinformation a communication challenge for your organization?
Likert Scale 1-10

I don’t know | prefer not to answer

12) How effective is your organization in dealing with misinformation?
Likert Scale 1-10

I don’t know | prefer not to answer

13) Do you expect misinformation to be an increased communication challenge in the
future?
Likert Scale 1-10

I don’t know | prefer not to answer

14) Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: Misinformation is a substantial
challenge to our organization’s reputation and image.
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Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
15) Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: Misinformation influences the
communication strategy of our organization.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
16) Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: My organization is well
prepared to deal with misinformation.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
17) Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: My organization’s current
strategy to combat misinformation is effective.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
18) Is online trolling a communication challenge for your organization?
Likert Scale 1-10
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
19) How effective is your organization in dealing with online trolling?
Likert Scale 1-10
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
20) Do you expect online trolling to increase in the future?
Likert Scale 1-10
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
21) Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: Truth always prevails over
misinformation.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
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I don’t know | prefer not to answer
22) Do you agree/disagree with the following statement: The marketplace of ideas is
broken
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
23) Are you familiar with the terms DeepFake and Synthetic Media?
Never heard of it | Heard about it | I am familiar with the term | I know quite a bit about it| I
am an expert
“Never heard of it” > end of survey
Otherwise, the following definitions will be provided to establish common ground:
DeepFake: A video of a person in which their face or body has been digitally altered so that they
appear to be someone else, typically used maliciously or to spread false information.1
Synthetic Media: An all-encompassing term for the artificial creation or modification of media
by “machines” – particularly programs that rely on artificial intelligence and machine
learning. Some types of synthetic media today include AI-written music, text generation,
imagery and video, voice synthesis and more.2
24) Do you think DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are going to have positive or rather
negative implications for professional communicators?
Negative | Somewhat Negative | Neither Negative Nor Positive | Somewhat Positive | Positive
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
25) Do you think DeepFakes and Synthetic Media are currently a problem for
communicators?
Likert Scale 1-10
I don’t know | prefer not to answer

1
2

https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/deepfake
https://digitalhumans.com/blog/what-is-synthetic-media-digital-human-technology/
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26) Do you expect DeepFakes and Synthetic Media to become a problem for
communicators in the future?
Very Unlikely | Somewhat Unlikely | Neither likely nor unlikely | Likely | Extremely Likely
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
27) When do you expect DeepFakes and Synthetic Media to become a challenge for your
organization?
0-2 years | 3-5 years | 5-10 years
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
28) What type of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media do you expect to be most dominant in
the future?
Harmless & Humorous | Trolling & Annoyance | Malicious & Criminal
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
29) Do you agree with the following statement: DeepFakes will undermine public trust and
truth finding.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
30) How familiar are you with strategies to combat DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?
Likert Scale 1-10
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
31) Do you agree with the following statement: My organization leadership is aware of
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
32) Do you agree with the following statement: My organization is prepared to deal with
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree nor Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
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I don’t know | prefer not to answer
33) Do you agree with the following statement: My organization factures DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media into our reputation and crisis communication strategies.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
34) My organization works with experts and consultants to deal with DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media.
Never | Sometimes | Regular
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
35) Do you agree with the following statement: DeepFakes and Synthetic Media should be
banned.
Disagree | Somewhat Disagree | Neither Agree or Disagree |Somewhat Agree | Strongly agree
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
36) Which institutions do you think should be in charge of regulating DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media
Government | Online Platforms | Neither
I don’t know | prefer not to answer
37) Would you be willing to participate in a 30min follow up interview via Zoom?
Yes | No
Ø “Yes” Sent email to: axel.ebermann@baruchmail.cuny.edu
Thank you for participating. Please feel free to forward this survey on to anyone who may
qualify.
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Appendix B: Sampling Methods
1) Non-for-profit
Data Set:
Top 100 Nonprofit Organizations (2021 Edition). Top Nonprofits. (2021, May 3).
https://topnonprofits.com/lists/best-nonprofits-on-the-web/
Random sample of 50 out of 100 companies via www.numbergenerator.org
Numbers for randomization
79 5 38 12 27 37 87 20 90 36 28 84 29 2 86 66 75 33 4 11 32 80 55 81 31 71 91 10 85 6 13 65 93
21 73 59 76 53 43 56 69 30 16 67 17 35 41 61 89 97
50 non-profit companies picked via randomization:
Count

Randomized Org Name
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

2
4
5
6
10
11
12
13
16
17
20
21
27
28
29
30
31

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Mozilla
American Red Cross
Museum of Modern Art
National Geographic Society
American Museum of Natural History
Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres
Public Broadcasting Service
Samaritan's Purse
Wikimedia Foundation
Ted Talks
St. Jude's Children's Research Hospital
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Zoological Society of San Diego
Planned Parenthood Federation of America
WikiLeaks
American Cancer Society
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
32 (ASPCA)
33 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
35 Mayo Foundation
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21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

36
37
38
41
43
53
55
56
61
65
66
67
69
71
73
75
76
79
80
81
84
85
86
87
89
90
91
93
97
59

UN Commission on Human Rights/UN Human Rights Council
(Geneva)
Donors Choose
Art Institute of Chicago
Girl Scouts of the USA
United States Olympic Committee
Creative Commons
Council on Foreign Relations
Natural Resources Defense Council
College Board
National Wildlife Federation
Kiva
The Trevor Project
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
Charity: water
Charity Navigator
WGBH
American Lung Association
Open Society Foundations
United Way
Federation of American Scientists
American Diabetes Association
Philadelphia Museum of Art
ONE
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
Catholic Relief Services
Christian Broadcasting Network
Save the Children
RandCorporation
Arthritis Foundation
Habitat for Humanity

Selection criteria as per topnonprofits3
Social – Facebook Likes and Twitter Followers
Though follower counts aren’t a perfect measure of social media authority, they are certainly a
great indication and are the easiest to understand and measure. These numbers can be found
by going to the primary facebook and twitter pages owned by an organization. If an

3

https://topnonprofits.com/lists/best-nonprofits-on-the-web/
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organization owns multiple accounts on a single social network, we only count the largest as
this eliminates inflation caused by duplicate followers.
Buzz Depth – Moz’s Page Authority
Predicts the website home page ranking in search engines based on an algorithmic combination
of the number of sites linking to it, the total number of links, Facebook shares & likes, tweets,
and Google +1s.
Buzz Scope – Moz’s Linking Root Domains
The number of unique root domains containing at least one url linking to the website’s
homepage.
Traffic – Alexa Rank
Alexa’s traffic rankings are based on the usage patterns of Alexa Toolbar users and data
collected from other, diverse sources over a rolling 3-month period. A site’s ranking is based on
a combined measure of reach and pageviews. Reach is determined by the number of unique
Alexa users who visit a site on a given day. Pageviews are the total number of Alexa user URL
requests for a site. However, multiple requests for the same URL on the same day by the same
user are counted as a single pageview. The site with the highest combination of users and
pageviews is ranked #1.
Responsibility and Transparency – Charity Navigator Rating Scale (Overall)
Charity Navigator rates organizations based on a complex series of fiscal responsibility and
transparency metrics. One limitation to this metric is that not all organizations on our list are
currently rated by Charity Navigator. Still, in this edition of the list we chose to include it when
calculating our top 100 because of the unique value they bring.
FAQ: HOW THE LIST IS COMPUTED
•
•
•

•
•

•

Thousands of nonprofit organizations are reviewed in a preliminary screening to
determine if their statistics are competitive enough to be ranked.
250-500 organizations are then selected to be ranked.
Data is collected for each nonprofit from all 7 measured criteria (i.e., Facebook Likes,
Twitter Followers, Moz Page Rank (homepage), Moz Linking Root Domains, Alexa Rank,
and Charity Navigator Rating).
For each of the 6 measured criteria, each organization is ranked in comparison to all
other nonprofit organizations being evaluated.
A composite rank for each nonprofit is determined by 1/3 weight to social media (Likes
and Followers), 1/3 weight to overall website rankings (Alexa, Page Authority, Linking
Root Domains, PageRank) and 1/3 to Charity Navigator Rating.
The top 100 organizations are published.

Notes: Colleges, universities, and individual churches are not included on this list.
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2) For-for-profit
Data Set: S&P 500
The Standard and Poor's 500,[2] or simply the S&P 500,[4] is a free-float weighted
measurement stock market index of 500 of the largest companies listed on stock exchanges in
the United States. It is one of the most commonly followed equity indices.4
S&P500 data set downloaded via
Datopian. (n.d.). s-and-p-500-companies-financials - DataHub - Frictionless Data. DataHub.
https://datahub.io/core/s-and-p-500-companies-financials/r/0.html
Random sample of 50 out of 505 companies via www.numbergenerator.org
Randomization data set:
240 104 135 253 386 209 377 264 127 279 447 230 394 64 385 445 7 14 278 501 339 234 55
320 421 347 32 20 131 499 470 34 336 322 219 5 292 491 21 61 70 129 196 192 208 418 402
232 191 194
50 for-profit corporations via randomization:
Count

Randomized
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

4

5
7
14
20
21
27
32
55
57
61
70
104

Company Name

Business Category

Accenture plc
Acuity Brands Inc
AFLAC Inc
Alexandria Real Estate Equities Inc
Alexion Pharmaceuticals
Allstate Corp
Ameren Corp
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.
Automatic Data Processing
Becton Dickinson
Charter Communications

Information Technology
Industrials
Financials
Real Estate
Health Care
Financials
Utilities
Consumer Staples
Financials
Information Technology
Health Care
Consumer Discretionary

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%26P_500

139

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

127
129
131
135
191
192
194
196
208
209
219
223
232
234
240
253
264
278
279
292
320
322
336
339
347
377
385
386
387
402
418
421
445
447
463
484
492
501

ConocoPhillips
Constellation Brands
Costco Wholesale Corp.
CSX Corp.
FedEx Corporation
Fidelity National Information Services
FirstEnergy Corp
FLIR Systems
Gartner Inc
General Dynamics
Grainger (W.W.) Inc.
Harris Corporation
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc
Home Depot
Huntington Bancshares
Intl Flavors & Fragrances
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Laboratory Corp. of America Holding
Lam Research
Macy's Inc.
Morgan Stanley
Mylan N.V.
NiSource Inc.
Norfolk Southern Corp.
Occidental Petroleum
Prologis
Quanta Services Inc.
Quest Diagnostics
Range Resources Corp.
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd
Southern Co.
Starbucks Corp.
Tiffany & Co.
TJX Companies Inc.
United Health Group Inc.
Waters Corporation
Whirlpool Corp.
Xylem Inc.

Energy
Consumer Staples
Consumer Staples
Industrials
Industrials
Information Technology
Utilities
Information Technology
Information Technology
Industrials
Industrials
Information Technology
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Discretionary
Financials
Materials
Financials
Health Care
Information Technology
Consumer Discretionary
Financials
Health Care
Utilities
Industrials
Energy
Real Estate
Industrials
Health Care
Energy
Consumer Discretionary
Utilities
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Discretionary
Health Care
Health Care
Consumer Discretionary
Industrials
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3) Think Tank Sampling
Data set via:
The 50 Most Influential Think Tanks in the United States. TheBestSchools.org. (2021, March
31). https://thebestschools.org/features/most-influential-think-tanks/

Name
1. Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs
2. Earth Institute
3. Heritage Foundation
4. Human Rights Watch
5. Kaiser Family Foundation
6. Council on Foreign Relations
7. Brookings Institution
8. Cato Institute
9. Ludwig von Mises Institute
10. American Enterprise Institute
11. RAND Corporation
12. Center for American Progress
13. Guttmacher Institute
14. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
15. National Bureau of Economic Research
16. Electronic Privacy Information Center
17. Peterson Institute for International
Economics
18. Center for Strategic and International
Studies
19. Urban Institute
20. Economic Policy Institute
21. Aspen Institute
22. Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars
23. Hoover Institution
24. Manhattan Institute for Policy Research
25. Center for Immigration Studies

political
orientation

independent
centrist
conservative
liberal
independent
independent
progressive
liberitarian
liberitarian
conservative
independent
progressive
liberal
progressive
independent
liberitarian
independent
centrist
liberal
liberal
centrist
centrist
conservative
conservative
independent
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26. Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
27. Open Society Foundation
28. Freedom House
29. New America Foundation
30. Independent Institute
31. Heartland Institute
32. Commonwealth Fund
33. Discovery Institute
34. Bipartisan Policy Center
35. Acton Institute
36. Atlantic Council
37. Public Policy Institute of California
38. Worldwatch Institute
39. Mercatus Center at George Mason
University
40. Center for a New American Security
41. Competitive Enterprise Institute
42. The Russell Sage Foundation
43. Reason Foundation
44. Inter-American Dialogue
45. Stimson Center
46. James A. Baker III Institute for Public
Policy
47. Carnegie Council for Ethics in
International Affairs
48. Third Way
49. Claremont Institute
50. Lexington Institute

centrist
progressive
centrist
independent
independent
conservative
liberal
conservative
centrist
conservative
centrist
independent
independent
liberitarian
centrist
liberitarian
independent
liberitarian
liberal
independent
independent
independent
liberal
conservative
independent

Inclusion criteria5:
Think tank: The term denotes a group of people who are paid to do nothing but read, discuss, think, and
write, usually to address and redress a matter of vital importance to humanity.
You can think of a think tank as a research university blessed with a complete absence of students and
where, as a consequence, none of its professors has to teach---all they have to do is research, research,
research.
At last count, the United States had 1,984 think tanks---nearly a third of the world's total. American think
5

https://thebestschools.org/features/most-influential-think-tanks/
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tanks are constantly researching solutions to a variety of the world's problems, and then arguing,
advocating, and lobbying for policy changes at local, state, and federal levels.
Some think tanks, such as the Brookings Institution or the Heritage Foundation, have become household
names and are cited frequently by major news corporations. Others are cited by outside organizations
less frequently, or perhaps not at all, but publish their own articles and books for a select---and at
times even sizable---audience.
The institutions on this list make up the 50 most influential think tanks in the United States. What makes
a think tank influential? One way to gauge the influence of a think tank is to focus on the scholars active
in it, their record of publications and other scholarly achievements, and how deeply these have affected
the culture's climate of opinion.
Our approach in ranking think tanks takes a different tack. As a business enterprise ourselves, we regard
think tanks as principally in the business of selling their ideas. In this age of the Internet, in which every
think tank has a website, we therefore can regard think tanks as in the business of search engine
marketing, i.e., as attempting to market their ideas over the Internet and especially through their
website.
Enter the tools that online businesses, like ours, use to assess how well websites and their pages are
ranking with the search engines (we use several such tools, notably SEMrush.com). At
TheBestSchools.org, we need these tools to determine how well we are doing in attracting and holding
visitor traffic---in other words, to determine how influential our website is.
Accordingly, in choosing and ranking the think tanks on this list, we employed the following criteria,
which look less at the intrinsic merit of a think tank and its intellectual program as at its pragmatic or
"cash value" (as the philosopher William James would have put it):
• The popularity of a think tank's official website, ranked against all other websites, as determined
by the average number of monthly visitors (specifically, organic search traffic), number of
keywords/phrases for which the site ranks, and the monetary value of the traffic as gauged by those
keywords. All these numbers come from SEMrush, and this is our master criterion.
• Average yearly revenue (in most cases, over the course of five years) as reported by the think
tanks. As non-profit organizations, think-tanks must make their revenue numbers available to the public;
the greater its revenue, the more influential the think tank---other things being equal.
• The average number of printed media references per year by outside organizations (according to
fair.org and Nexis).
• The number of categories in which a think tank was ranked by the University of Pennsylvania
(Lauder Institute) in its 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index. This report does not reflect intrinsic
intellectual performance or academic accomplishment per se. Rather, it is based on the perceptions of
hundreds of journalists, policymakers, and think tank employees.
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Appendix C: Question List Communication Professionals
1) Please explain your understanding of the terms ‘DeepFake’ and ‘Synthetic Media’.
After the initial answer, in order to establish a common ground on terms, the researcher will
provide the following definitions of ‘DeepFake’ and ‘Synthetic Media’ to the interviewee,
verbally and in writing via Zoom chat.
DeepFake: A video of a person in which their face or body has been digitally altered so that they
appear to be someone else, typically used maliciously or to spread false information.6
Synthetic Media: An all-encompassing term for the artificial creation or modification of media
by “machines” – particularly programs that rely on artificial intelligence and machine
learning. Some types of synthetic media today include AI-written music, text generation,
imagery and video, voice synthesis and more.7
2) What is your overall sentiment concerning DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?
3) What are your biggest concerns as far as Deepfakes and Synthetic Media are
concerned?
4) Which positive or constructive use in communications do you anticipate for DeepFakes
and Synthetic Media as far as your organization is concerned?
5) In which way could DeepFakes and Synthetic Media become a challenge for your
organization?
6) How much do you anticipate this to be a problem in your industry?
Follow up questions: Which areas and personnel of your organization do you think will be
affected most and how?
7) In how far are organization and the marketplace of ideas are prepared to deal with
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?
8) Are decision makers in your organization adequately informed and equipped to deal
with the challenge of Deepfakes?
9) How do you think DeepFakes and Synthetic Media will influence the crisis and
reputation management of your organization?
10) What do you think are the most problematic areas concerning DeepFakes and Synthetic
Media within your organization, but also on the greater marketplace of ideas?
11) How do you think the use of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media will play out within the
next 5-10 years?
12) What communication strategies do you think could help to deal with the malicious use
of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?
6
7

https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/deepfake
https://digitalhumans.com/blog/what-is-synthetic-media-digital-human-technology/
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13) Where do you think most DeepFakes will originate? Amateurs, trolls, professional
players?
14) Can you please outline your ‘best case’ and ‘worst case’ prediction of the effects of
DeepFakes and Synthetic Media?
15) What role do you think Social Media platforms and regulators should play in this
context?
16) What do you think are best practices for communicators in dealing with DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media?
17) Please list and explain technical tools and methods that you are aware of to detect and
fight the malicious use of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media.
18) Do you think there is enough knowledge within corporate communication departments
and the public to use these tools?
19) Is there anything that I have not touched on that you would like to add?
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Appendix D – Informed Consent scripts
1) Internet-Based Informed Consent script For Survey Communication Professionals
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Baruch College
Corporate Communication Department
Internet-Based Informed Consent Script For Survey Communication Professionals
Title of Research Study: The Effects of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on Communication
Professionals
Principal Investigator: Axel Ebermann, MA in Corporate Communication Student
Email: axel.ebermann@baruchmail.cuny.edu
Advisor: Dr. Minna Logemann, Assistant Professor, Department of Communication Studies
Minna.Logemann@baruch.cuny.edu
Hello,
You are being asked to participate in this research study because your knowledge and
experience in the communications field makes you a great asset for my research.
The purpose of this study is to explore the Effects of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on
Communication Professionals. There are no direct benefits for participating in this research,
however you may want to participate in this study if you want to help advance knowledge
about this topic and consequently benefit society as a whole. You may not want to participate
in this study, if you are unable to complete the survey within one sitting of 15 minutes.
•

If you agree to participate, I will ask you to participate in a survey consisting of 37
questions. Questions will revolve around the issue of misinformation and disinformation
in the information sphere, how DeepFakes and Synthetic Media may change those
dynamics and which measures could be used to combat the malicious use of this new
technology. The completion of this survey will take approximately 15 minutes.

•

This research presents very minimal risk of data breach due to the survey being conducted
on the Internet. To mitigate this risk, all surveys will be conducted through the software
platform Qualtrics and will be anonymous as the “anonymize response” button will be
marked off so that personal information is not recorded, and the contact association is
removed. The second risk is psychological discomfort. If you do not feel comfortable with
any specific questions you will be able to skip them. You can also end the survey at any
point if you choose to do so.
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•

I am the only one who has access to my Qualtrics username and account, and any data
exported will not have participant’s direct identifiers attached. The data will be stored
on my personal computer. The final data will be stored on my adviser's password
protected computer on campus for three years and then destroyed.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you have any questions, you can contact the
researcher Axel Ebermann at 917-478-3456 / axel.ebermann@baruchmail.cuny.edu or the
Faculty Advisor Dr. Minna Logemann at Minna.Logemann@baruch.cuny.edu. If you have any
questions about your rights as a research participant or if you would like to talk to someone other
than the researchers, you can contact CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918
or HRPP@cuny.edu.
Do you consent to participating in this survey?
2) Oral and Internet-Base Consent Script for Tech Experts – Interview
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Baruch College
Corporate Communication Department
Internet-Based Informed Consent Script For Interview - DeepFake and Synthetic Media
Experts
Title of Research Study: The Effects of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media on Communication
Professionals
Principal Investigator: Axel Ebermann, MA in Corporate Communication Student
Email: axel.ebermann@baruchmail.cuny.edu
Advisor: Dr. Minna Logemann, Assistant Professor, Department of Communication Studies
Minna.Logemann@baruch.cuny.edu
Hello, thank you for taking the time to speak to me today.
You are being asked to participate in this research study because your knowledge and
experience in the field of DeepFakes and Synthetic Media makes you a great asset for my
research. The purpose of this research study is to explore the Effects of DeepFakes and
Synthetic Media on Communication Professionals. You may want to participate in this study if
you want to help advance knowledge about this topic and consequently benefit society as a
whole. You may not want to participate in this study if you are unable to participate in a 30minute interview in one sitting.
•

If you agree to participate, I will conduct an interview that will take approximately 30
minutes. Questions will revolve around the issue of misinformation and disinformation in
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the information sphere, how DeepFakes and Synthetic Media may change those dynamics
and which measures could be used to combat the malicious use of this new technology.
•

This research presents a minimal risk of a breach of data and subject privacy due to
Zoom's conferencing software and the interview being conducted over the internet.
There is also a risk of breach of confidentiality since I will know the interviewee’s
identity. Lastly, interviewees may feel discomfort answering some of the interview
questions. To mitigate or reduce the risks of breach of data and subject privacy, CUNY's
Zoom Security protocol will be used. To minimize the risk of a breach of confidentiality
and provide subject privacy, recordings will be reviewed along with transcriptions for
accuracy and then recordings will be permanently deleted. You as participant can
choose to remain anonymous. In that case all personal identifying factors and
participant names will be removed from the transcriptions and will not be printed down
anywhere, including in my thesis paper. To minimize any discomfort, the interviewees
could choose to decline in answering a specific question and stop the interviewee at any
time.

•

With your consent, the interview will be recorded via Zoom. Zoom recordings of
interviews will be saved to my password protected computer, in which only I have
access to, right after the interview. To maintain confidentiality, recordings will only be
accessible to me and my advisor. The recordings will be reviewed along with
transcriptions and then recordings will be permanently deleted. Any personal identifying
factors and participants name will be removed. My advisor will store the complete data
set on their password protected computer at Baruch College for a minimum of 3 years
and then it will be destroyed. Personal identifying factors and participants names will be
removed from transcriptions.
The information provided by you for this study will not be used anymore or distributed
for additional research.

•

Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you have any questions, you can contact the
researcher Axel Ebermann at 917-478-3456 / axel.ebermann@baruchmail.cuny.edu or the
Faculty Advisor Dr. Minna Logemann at Minna.Logemann@baruch.cuny.edu. If you have any
questions about your rights as a research participant or if you would like to talk to someone other
than the researchers, you can contact CUNY Research Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918
or HRPP@cuny.edu.
-

Do you consent to participating in this interview?
Would you prefer to keep your answers anonymous, or would you like to be named in the
final research paper?
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